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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Paul R. Baier* 
FOREWORD: OF ALIENAGE, JUDICIAL HEROES, AND 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
There was a time-fortunately buried in the United States 
Reports-when government could deny to aliens the ordinary 
means of earning a living without running afoul of the equal pro­
tection clause. In the old Deckebach 1 case, for example, the City of 
Cincinnati thought it would be a good idea to exclude aliens ·as a 
group from operating billiard parlors, and the Supreme Court 
unanimously affirmed the discrimination. 2 Whether aliens, as such, 
were less qualified than citizens to run pool halls was none of the 
Supreme Court's business: "It is not necessary that we be satisfied 
that this premise is well founded in experience."3 Rather, 
It is enough for present purposes that the ordinance, in the 
light of facts admitted or generally assumed, does not preclude the 
possibility of a rational basis for the legislative judgment and that 
we have no such knowledge of local conditions as would enable us to 
say that it is clearly wrong.• 
The Court here seems to be throwing up its hands and exclaiming, 
"What do we know?" Old equal protection, it is fair to say, was no 
protection at all; the rational basis test was a mere champagne 
promise. This was 1927, the same year Mr. Justice Holmes curtly 
sanctioned cutting the Fallopian tubes of feeble-minded women: 
"The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad 
* Associate Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. 
Member of the Louisiana Bar and the Bar Association of the Fifth Federal circuit. Judicial 
Fellow, Supreme Court of the United States, 1975-1976. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the able assistance of Mr. James Viator, Executive 
Editor, Louisiana Law Review, whose deep researches illuminated otherwise dark areas of 
the law. 
1. Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927). 
2. Id. at 397. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
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enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes."� As a law 
.
teacher, I 
should hope this sentence would startle my students. Plamly, these 
were the dark days of liberty and equality. To seek the shelter of 
the equal protection clause, Holmes c ould only quip, "is the usual 
last resort of constitutional arguments. "6 
Other lights-some of our greatest judges-have perceived the 
fourteenth amendment and the duty of judges differently. To force 
a �an out of his employment as a c ook in a restaurant "simply 
because he is an alien," Charles Evans Hughes recognized, would 
reduce the guarantee of equal protection of the laws to "a barren 
form of words."7 Likewise, to sterilize larcenists but not embezzlers 
"is a clear, pointed, unmistakable discrimination," as Justice 
Douglas declared in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson. 8 Nor 
should judges blink at discrimination touching "the basic civil 
rights of man."9 As a judge, William 0. Douglas' instincts were dif­
ferent; he emphasized that: 
[S]trict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a steril­
ization law is essential, lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious dis­
criminations are made against groups or types of individuals in vio­
lation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.10 
Here the Court takes its own hard look at the challenged law; the 
burden falls on the State to defend it; the judges make up their 
own minds whether the statutory plan makes sense. This is the 
new equal protection: the fourteenth amendment is a bulwark, and 
the judges are guardians without blindfolds. 
Justice Douglas was once asked which Supreme Court justice 
had the greatest influence on him. His answer: 
5. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927), to which Justice Holmes added: "Three gen-
erations of imbeciles are enough." Id. 
6. Id. at 208. 
7. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915). 
8. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
9. !d. �ustice Douglas' reasoning in Skinner stands in bright contrast to Holmes' dark 
declaration m Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. at 207-08. Said Douglas: 
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the �ace. The power �o sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastat­ing effec�s. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the dommant group to wither and disappear. There is no redemption for the individ­ual w�o� the la":' touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is to his irrepa­rable m1ury. He 1s forever deprived of a basic liberty. 
316 U.S. at 541. 
10. 316 U.S. at 541 (emphasis added}. 
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I think probably one of our greatest judges in all history is Charles 
Evans Hughes, who was Chief Justice when I came on the Court, 
and I served with him about three years. I think he was preeminent 
in the field of civil liberties and was a very bold, courageous judge 
who saw clearly when it came to human rights, civil rights, the rights 
of minorities, and so forth. I think that probably Charles Evans 
Hughes had as much influence as any other single judge.11 
In the Japanese Fishing Rights11 case, Hughes's example inspired 
Hugo Black to extend the shelter of the equal protection clause to 
aliens who wanted to fish off California's coast. "We are unable to 
find," Justice Black wrote for the Court, "that the 'special public 
interest' on which California relies provides support for this state 
ban on Takahashi's commercial fishing."11 The old deference is 
gone. 
Enough history. Every law clerk today can recite the principle 
of Graham u. Richardson14 that "classifications based on alienage, 
like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and 
subject to close judicial scrutiny. "18 This is a powerful-some 
would say dubious-analogy. It is ironic, at this molar point in the 
evolution of the law of alienage and equal protection, that the cur­
rent Supreme Court should rely on the Carolene Products foot­
note. We are told: "Aliens as a class are a pri.me example of a 'dis­
crete and insular' minority (see United States u. Carolene 
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153, n.4 (1938)) for whom such 
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."lt Note 4 is, of 
course, attributed to Harlan Fiske Stone, but in point of historical 
fact the "discrete and insular minorities" idea was the footwork of 
Justice Stone's legal secretary, Louis Lusky, who has since written 
a hook about the footnote.17 According to Professor Lusky, the 
Court's "abrupt announcement in the Graham case is incompre- · 
hensible. "18 The idea that Stone would ever have held alienage a 
"suspect" classification calling for heightened judicial review is ut-
11. Interview with William O. Douglas, by Howard Langer (1957) (audio cassette, No. 
200-2175, available from The National Archives, Washington, D.C.) 
12. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
13. Id. at 420. 
14. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
15. Id. at 372 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
16. Id. (per Blackmun, J., for the Court). All members of the Court, except Justice 
Harlan, joined in this equation. 
17. L. LusKv, Bv WHAT RIGHT? ch. VII, at 108-14 (1975). 
18. Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 
l093, 1105 n.72 (1982). 
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ter nonsense: "This is an amazing assertion," says Lusk�.19 �ustice 
Rehnquist makes precisely the same point about Stone m his tell­
ing dissent in Sugarman v. Dougall,20 and it must be ad� itted that 
the Professor and the Justice are right. After all, the United States 
Reports plainly show it was Harlan Fiske Stone who wrote the 
Deckebach case, which we know held, without any footnotes about 
discrete and insular minorities, that aliens, as such, were unfit to 
run pool halls, or so Cincinnati could avouch without fear of con­
tradiction in the nation's last resort of EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER 
LAW.21 No, it is to judges like Charles Evans Hughes-"the au-
19. Id. 
20. 413 U.S. 634, 649-50, 656-57 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting): 
[T]here is no language used in the [Fourteenth] Amendment, or any historical evi­
dence as to the intent of the Framers, which would suggest to the slightest degree 
that it was intended to render alienage a "suspect" classification, that it was designed 
in any way to protect "discrete and insular minorities" other than racial minorities, 
or that it would in any way justify the result reached by the court . . . . 
The mere recitation of the words "insular and discrete minority" is hardly a con­
stitutional reason for prohibiting state legislative classifications such as are involved 
here, and is not necessarily consistent with the theory propounded in that footnote. 
The approach taken in Graham and these cases appears to be that whenever the 
Court feels that a societal group is "discrete and insular," it has the constitutional 
mandate to prohibit legislation that somehow treats the group differently from some 
other group. 
Our society, consisting of over 200 million individuals of multitudinous origins, 
customs, tongues, beliefs, and cultures is, to say the least, diverse. It would hardly 
take extraordinary ingenuity for a lawyer to find "insular and discrete" minorities at 
every turn in the road. Yet, unless the Court can precisely define and constitutionally 
justify both the terms and analysis it uses, these decisions today stand for the pro­
position that the Court can choose a "minority" it "feels" deserves "solicitude" and 
thereafter prohibit the States from classifying that "minority" differently from the 
"majority." I cannot find, and the Court does not cite, any constitutional authority 
for such a "ward of the Court" approach to equal protection. 
21. So the expression appears, hammered in marble, in the west portico of the Su­
preme Court Building overshining the front steps to the Courthouse doors. Charles Evans 
Hughes, as Chief Justice and Chairman of the Building Commission when the Supreme 
Court's new h.o�e went u? in 1932-35, handed down-really handed sideways to Van De­vanter-a dec1�:on �ppr�vmg _
the archi�ct's
. suggestion that the words "EQUAL JUSTICE UNDE� LAW
_ 
� mscr1?ed m th
_
e mam frieze of the west portico. Someone later accused �he Chief �ustJ�e _
of havmg permitted tautology, verbosity and redundancy; each of which 
1s an abomma�1on m good usage." Hebert Bayard Swope to Charles Evans Hughes, Jan. 25, 
1935, quoted i� 2 M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 689 (1951). Hughes replied: 
Immediate judgment. Indictment quashed. 
The distre�s which led to your complaint may be somewhat alleviated if for a 
�oment you will free yourself from the tyranny of the blue pencil and consider the history of the law "Equal J t' " · · . . . · . us ice is a time-honored phrase placing a strong empha-sis upon i�partialtty,-an emphasis which it is well to retain. 
Id. 
There is a long history in that phrase. Try to bear with it . 
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thentic voice of the American Constitution"22-that aliens must 
look for judicial protection. It is largely through the work of judi­
cial heroes that the law of alienage and equal protection has taken 
shape. And, in the words of Alexander Bickel, himself an alien 
when he reached America's shores: "It is gratifying ... that we 
live under a Constitution to which the concept of citizenship mat­
ters very little indeed. It prescribes decencies and wise modalities 
of government quite without regard to that concept."23 
A. Citizenship and Notaries Public 
Texas requires its notaries public to be United States citizens, 
a statutory classification that plainly favors Texans over resident 
Mexicans. 2" Again, this is discrimination based on alienage, and 
the judicial result depends on, first, what the judges think about 
the function of the notary public in relation to state government, 
and, second, on what sort of review-relaxed or strict-the judges 
will apply in testing the Texas scheme. In Vargas v. Strake, 2& two 
Fifth Circuit judges thought that Texas notaries are so connected 
to the day-to-day functioning of state government as to fall within 
the narrow exception to strict scrutiny for state officers who "par­
ticipate directly in the formulation, operation, or review of broad 
public policy" and hence "perform functions that go to the heart of 
representative government."26 Notaries public in Texas are consti­
tutional officers: their appointment is authorized in the state con­
stitution.27 "The Texas political community depends upon the no-
22. Bickel, Citizenship in th e Am erican Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 381 (1973). 
I have borrowed Professor Bickel's description of the holding of T ruax u. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 
41, (1915), and applied it to Hughes himself. 
23. Bickel, supra note 22, at 387. When he wrote this article Bickel was Chancellor 
Kent Professor of Law and Legal History at Yale University. As a younger man, Bickel 
immigrated to the United States from his native Rumania in 1938 at the age of fourteen, 
and four years later he was naturalized as an American citizen. He took his public high 
schooling in New York City; thence to C.C.N.Y. and to the Harvard Law School. World War 
II saw him fighting as a machine gunner for America. "The product of his mind and 
pen-for in him substance and style joined beautifully-was always fresh, exciting, provoca­
tive, and, in the truest sense, educational." Sacks, A Tribute to Al exander M. Bickel, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 689, 690 (1975). 
. 
24. The statute provides that "[t]o be eligible for appointment as a Notary Public, a 
person shall be a resident citizen of the United States and of this state . .. " TEX. REV. 
C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 5949(2) (West Supp. 1984). 
25. 710 F.2d 190 (5th Cir 1983) (per Reavley, J., joined by Politz, J.). 
26. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). 
27. Id. at 196. "The Secretary of State shall appoint a c onvenient number of Notaries 
Public for the state . . .  " TEx. CONST. art. IV, § 26. Texas is one of only six states in which 
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tary public," says the majority,28 and a stran?er to Texa: is in no 
position, presumably, to challenge �his assert10n. T_he offic�
2
�f no­
tary public in Texas "is not a mere JOb or so�r�e of _mc?me, a?ds 
Judge Reavley, himself a Texan. A notary s JOb is hke a police­
man's "in importance to the functioning of state government."30 
Since Massachusetts can require its state troopers to be citizens 
without violating the Constitution,31 Texas can require as much of 
its notaries public. Applying relaxed review, the majority concludes 
that the citizenship requirement "bears a rational relationship to 
the state's interest in the proper and orderly handling of a count­
less variety of legal documents of importance to the state. "32 This 
reasoning is reminiscent of the old blindfold approach to judging 
classifications based on alienage. "Texas has a valid interest and 
right to define for itself the qualifications for the position of notary 
public," according to the majority.33 In other words, a good alien 
cannot make a good notary in Texas. 
The amazing thing about this notary case is not that the Su­
preme Court promptly granted certiorari and reversed the Fifth 
Circuit by the lopsided vote of 8 t o  1. 34 No, reversal was easily 
predictable. The a mazing thing is that two intelligent Fifth Circuit 
judges and their law clerks should have made such a blunder in the 
first place. I realize, of course, that with hindsight even a fool is 
wise, but it seems necessarily to follow that since it is unconstitu­
tional to require lawyers to be citizens,35 Texas may not require its 
300,000 notaries public to be citizens either. 36 The greater pro­
nouncement, In re Griffiths, 37 barring Connecticut from discrimi­
nating against resident aliens in a ccess to the Bar, logically in­
c��des t�e lesser proscription running against Texas's ideas about 
c1tizensh1p and notaries public. It is t o  Senior Circuit Judge Ingra-
the state constitution provides for the appointment of notaries 1 G B T C 
TION OF THE STATE T A A 
. . RADEN, HE ONSTITU· 
OF EXAS: N NNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 361-62 (1977) 
28. 710 F.2d at 194. 
. 
29. Id. at 195. 
30. Id. 
31. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). 
32. 710 F.2d at 195. 
33. Id. 
34. Sub nom. Bernal v. Fainter, 104 S. Ct. 2312 (1984) 
35. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). 
. 
36. Counsel for the State conceded th t th b 
"Maybe there are 300,000 notaries" .d 
a 
'
e num er of Texas notaries exceeds 100,000. 
at 2318 n.12. 
' sa1 Texas s lawyer at oral argument. Bernal, 104 S. Ct. 
37. 413 U.S. 717 (1973). 
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Board for spending more money on athletics than on education 
without fear of losing his teacher's job.H But Judge Higginbotham 
is surely right, in Gonzalez v. Benavides;u to discern that nothing 
in the Pickering line denies the relevance of other governmental 
concerns in different factual settings. "Indeed, the common con­
ceptual strand to much of our First Amendment jurisprudence is 
context-time, place, and manner."46 Holmes, it seems, lives still: 
"[T]he character of every act," Holmes recognized, "depends upon 
the circumstances in which it is d one. The most stringent protec­
tion of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire 
in a theatre and causing a panic."47 Sheila Myers' questionnaire 
caused a kind of fire in the District Attorney's office in New Orle­
ans. As is widely known, she lost her job and the Supreme Court 
upheld the termination in Connick v. Myers: "The limited First 
Amendment interest involved here does not require that Connick 
tolerate action which he reasonably believed would disrupt the of­
fice, undermine his authority, and destroy close working relation­
ships. Myers' discharge therefore did not offend the First Amend­
ment."48 In other words, in the theater of public employment 
freedom of speech is no shibboleth. Judge Higginbotham's alert 
survey of the law of public employee free speech in Gonzalez v. 
Benavides is to the same effect: "First Amendment issues 
presented by speaking employees are not answerable by mechani­
cal formulae; courts must engage in a weighing exercise, giving 'full 
consideration of the government's i nterest in the effective and effi­
cient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public.' "49 
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). By the time of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 
404 (1963), it was already "too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and 
expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or 
privilege." Requiescat in pace 0.W.H. 
44. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), in which the Court held that a 
public employee does not relinquish first amendment rights to comment on matters of pub­
lic interest by virtue of government employment. The Court also recognized that the state's 
interests "as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees ... differ significantly 
from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in gen­
eral." Id. at 568. The problem, the Court said, was "to arrive at a balance between the 
interests of the [employee] .. . as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern 
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public ser­
vices it performs through its employees." Id. 
45. 712 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1983). 
46. Id. at 147. 
47. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (citations omitted). 
48. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. at 1694. 
49. 712 F.2d at 147 (quoting Connick v. Meyers), 103 S. Ct. at 1692. 
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In Gonzalez, the executive director of a community action 
agency was fired for publicly denying the supervisory authority 
over his job performance of the county commissioners court. Gon­
zalez claimed that under the agency's own rules only the agency's 
governing board could evaluate his performance. The district 
court, applying the Pickering balancing act, held for Gonzalez on 
free speech grounds, but the Fifth Circuit remanded because "this 
record presents a possibility that the relationship between the 
commissioners and Gonzalez fell into that narrow band of fragile 
relationships requiring for job security loyalty at the expense of 
unfettered [free] speech."50 Doubtless, government has an interest 
in allowing elected officials free reign to implement policies for 
which they must answer to the voters. "In more familiar language, 
knowing that the buck stops, and where, is a substantial govern­
mental interest."1n Thus, with respect to certain higher-ups in the 
executive chain, "[t]here is a governmental interest in securing 
those unique relationships between certain high level executives 
and the elected officials at whose grace they serve."H This does not 
mean, however, that Gonzalez's disavowal of the commissioners' 
supervisory authority over him automatically removes him from 
first amendment protection. "[J]ealous protection of speech rights 
abjures mechanical response," insists Judge Higginbotham.153 "[l]t 
follows that disruption of the relationship between an appointing 
authority and a holder of such a senior position may be weighed in 
the assaying of his First Amendment right to escape termination 
for a public disavowal of his appointing authority's power of super­
vision. "M The Gonzalez court is very careful, however, to leave the 
matter of weighing the respective interests to the trial court on re­
mand. "[W]e say no more than that such governmental interests 
are relevant to the First Amendment inquiry into the context of 
time, place, and manner."55 If the interest identified by the appel­
late court is implicated, "weighing is required because we do not 
decide that all speech by persons in such relationships is unpro­
tected. Rather, the speech must be weighed against its impact 
upon the relationship and the relationship's role in the elected offi-
50. Id. at 150. 
51. Id. at 148. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 147. 
54. Id. at 148. 
55. Id. 
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cial's discharge of his duties."56 
One senses Judge Higginbotham knew he was walking on eggs 
in Gonzalez u. Benauides, that is to say, I have a hunch less sensi­
tive judges might well have reversed outright in light of Gonzalez's 
executive status. Yet the panel's restraint is commendable in a free 
speech case involving a man caught between two competing legal 
masters and the call of public duty conscientiously pursued. Again, 
context is the key. On remand, the district court reaffirmed its de­
cision favoring Gonzalez_57 What will happen next when this "diffi­
cult legal play"58 returns to the Fifth Circuit is obviously not for 
me to say. But it will be a play worth watching. 
OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT, POLITICAL PATRONAGE, 
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Wholesale replacement of low-level public servants for reasons 
having to do with their political affiliation violates the first amend­
ment; this much is clear from a combined rereading of Elrod v. 
Burns59 and Branti u. Finkel.60 Thus, according to a majority of 
the Supreme Court, "the First Amendment prohibits the dismissal 
of a public employee solely because of his private political be­
liefs."61 Notice this says nothing at all about firing a deputy sheriff 
because he campaigns with all his might for the losing side in an 
election for sheriff. It may strike the ordinary voter as strange to 
learn that the winning candidate in a sheriff's race must rehire the 
defeated incumbent's deputies. However, that was the result 
reached by the Fifth Circuit a few years ago in Barrett v. 
Thomas,62 which saved the jobs of several Democratic deputy sher­
iffs in Dallas County, Texas, who were swept out of public employ­
ment in consequence of a Republican housecleaning effort. "The 
56. Id. at 150. 
57. "This Court has endeavored to faithfully perform the task assigned to it by the 
Fifth Circuit. So doing, it again concludes the Plaintiff Gonzales is entitled to prevail and a 
new judgment will be entered accordingly." Gonzales v. Benavides, Civ. No. L-80-46, at 13 
(S.D. Tex. (Laredo Div. July 10, 1984) (Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law) (unreported to date). 
58. By way of a "prologue" to his opinion in Gonzalez, Judge Higginbotham set forth 
the findings of the district court and added: "But these findings of fact only set the factual 
stage for a difficult legal play." 712 F.2d at 145. 
59. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
60. 445 U.S. 507 (1980). 
61. Branti, 445 U.S. at 5 16-17. 
62. 649 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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establishment of a political orthodoxy among public employees b y  
an executive official is constitutionally impermissible," said Judge 
Williams' unanimous opinion for the court.63 "Sheriff Thomas [the 
Republican winner at the polls; the loser in court] has not pointed 
to a vital governmental interest served by making his deputies toe 
the prescribed political line. "64 The discharged deputies were or­
dered reinstated with back pay, and their lawyer took his justly 
earned victory fee of slightly over $34,000-all assessed jointly and 
severally against both the defendant sheriff and the Dallas County 
public treasury. 6� 
A. Garbage Workers 
This term, in Bueno v. City of Donna,66 the court, again per 
Williams, J., continued its first amendment assault on the citadel 
of political patronage, condemning the discharge of two garbage 
dump workers and several other non-supervisory public works em­
ployees who had been fired in retaliation for supporting defen­
dants' opponents in a city election. The jury found it was a custom 
or policy of the City of Donna, acting through its officials, to cause 
the dismissal of city employees because of their support for opposi­
tion candidates in city elections. There was sufficient evidence of a 
conspiracy among the defendant city councilmen, and the panel 
approved the district court's legal conclusion that the individual 
defendants should have known their official actions " 'would vio­
late basic, substantial constitutional rights'" of the public employ­
ees involved.67 Citing Elrod v. Burns,68 Judge Williams' opinion 
concluded: "[A]t the time of the firings, the law was 'settled' that 
non-policy making employees cannot be discharged from their 
public employment because of their political activities . . . . "69 
The Bueno opinion, it should be noted, protects public employees 
in their political "activities," whereas Elrod and Branti guardedly 
speak only in terms of public employees' "private political be-
63. Id. at 1200. 
64. Id. 
65. Note well ye lawyers: "It is now settled law that a § 1988 attorney's fees award 
may run against a public treasury for § 1983 violations by public officers acting in their 
official capacities even though the public entity is not named as a defendant in the suit." 
Barrett v. Thomas, 649 F.2d at 1201 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 4 37 U.S. 678, 699 (1978)). 
66. 714 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1983). 
67. Id. at 495. 
68. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
69. 714 F.2d at 495 (emphasis added). 
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liefs."70 This distinction meant nothing to the Bueno court, nor 
should it in a case involving non-supervisory, non-policy making 
garbage workers. Bueno v. City of Donna is a very satisfying, in­
deed heroic, first amendment decision. It should be added, by way 
of introducing the judicial storm center next discussed, that Judges 
Garza and Rubin were also on the panel in Bueno, each voting in 
favor of reinstating the discharged public employees to their jobs. 
B. Deputy Sherift's Revisited: The Small County Context 
This brings us to McBee v. Jim Hogg County, Texas,71 an­
other political patronage case that proves the truth of Holmes' 
aphorism concerning life inside powerful appellate tribunals: "We 
are very quiet there, but it is the quiet of a storm centre, as we all 
know."72 Having played a small part in McBee, appearing by leave 
of court as amicus curiae on one of the briefs, 73 and having sat 
inside the en bane eye of the Fifth Circuit when this case was 
orally argued, I confidently believe that McBee v. Jim Hogg 
70. "Our concern with the impact of patronage on political belief and association does 
not occur in the abstract, for political belief and association constitute the core of those 
activities protected by the First Amendment." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. at 356 (footnote 
omitted) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.). Justice Stewart's vote in Elrod, which was the 
key to unlocking 5, was explicitly limited to discharges based on belief: "The single substan­
tive question involved in  this case is whether a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential govern­
ment employee can be discharged or threatened with discharge from a job that he is satis­
factorily performing upon the sole ground of his p olitical beliefs. I agree with the plurality 
that he cannot." Id. at 375 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). 
71. 703 F.2d 834 (1983), vacated on reh'g en bane, 730 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1984). 
72. O.W. HOLMES, Law and the Court (1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 292 
(1920). 
73. On behalf of certain former deputy sheriffs of Natchitoches Parish, Louisiana. See 
Dove v. Fletcher, 574 F. Supp. 600 (W.D. La. 1983) (granting summary judgment and dis­
missing deputies' claims as a matter of law), vacated, No. 83-4782, slip op. (5th Cir. 1984) 
(summary calendar) (per Clark, C.J., Politz & Higginbotham, JJ.) (unpublished per curiam 
opinion). The Natchitoches Parish deputy sheriffs case followed on the coattails of the Jim 
Hogg County case: 
The case at bar is factually and legally on all fours with this court's e n  bane 
ruling in McBee. In fact, Dove provides a stronger case than McBee for letting the 
trier of fact decide the issues. Natchitochees Parish, Louisiana, has a population of 
approximately 40,000, and the sheriff's department employs 31 deputies, as compared 
with Jim Hogg County, Texas, which has a p opulation of less than 6,000, and only 6 
field deputies. While McBee specifically rejected a mechanical formula that relies 
solely on the size of the county, the facts indicate that the political activity of the 
Louisiana plaintiffs would have less impact upon the efficient functioning of their 
sheriff's department than in the Texas case. Because we required that the facts in 
McBee be decided by the jury, the instant case also should reach the trier of fact. 
Dove, No. 83-4782, slip op. at 8. 
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County, Texas, is this term's most spectacular thunder and light­
ning. The case is an excruciating test of judicial acumen, regardless 
of which side of the judicial divide one happens to favor. 
Geography sometimes affects legal judgment. It plainly did 
when the McBee case first hit the Fifth Circuit. Judge Garza's 
panel opinion distinguishes Barrett v. Thomas:74 Jim Hogg 
County, unlike Dallas County, is a small place in rural South 
Texas; the sheriff's office is likewise small; therefore: 
Unlike Barrett, in the small county sheriff's department with merely 
six deputies, the sheriff may well work closely on a personal and 
confidential basis with his s t aff. The "absence of political cohesion 
between sheriff and deputy" may indeed be shown "to undermine 
an intimate working relationship." Accordingly, the exception of 
Elrod is much more implicated.75 
Elrod, of course excepts "policy making positions" from its in­
tended coverage, that is to say, a new President need not keep an 
old Cabinet. 76 But under Branti this exceptio n  is narrow. Labeling 
a particular position "policymaking" is not enough; rather, the 
burden falls on the public employer to show the connection be­
tween political loyalty and the job in question.77 As the McBee 
panel viewed the facts and the law: "We believe the evidence in 
this case supports a finding that the plaintiff deputies and dis­
patchers fall within the Elrod-Branti exception. "78 Furthermore, 
the panel tossed out as unsupported by the record the district 
court's findings of forbidden political animus.79 The trial court's 
74. 649 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1981). 
75. 703 F.2d at 841. 
76. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 ( 1976) (plurality opinion, Brennan, J.): 
A second interest advance d  in support of patronage is the need for political loy­
alty of employees, not to the end that effectiveness and efficiency be insured, but to 
the end that representative government not be undercut by tactics obstructing the 
implementation of policies of the new administration, policies presumably sanctioned 
by the electorate. The justification is not without force, but is nevertheless inade­
quate to validate patronage wholesale. Limiting patronage dismissals to policymaking 
positions is sufficient to achieve this governmental end. 
77. "In sum, the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confiden­
tial' fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can 
demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective perform­
ance of the public office involved." B ranti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980). 
78. 703 F.2d at 842. 
79. Id. at 844: 
Our review of the record leaves us with the "firm conviction" that Ybanez' deci­
sion not to rehire the plaintiffs was not shown to be based upon the plaintiffs' exer­
cise of their right to freely associate and support another candidate . . . .  [T]he rec-
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judgment for plaintiffs was reversed and the petition fo� rehearing 
en bane was promptly denied. There the ma�ter s�t
. 
while coun�el 
for the defeated deputies proceeded to get his petition for certio­
rari in order, including the printing, at considerable expense, of the 
required appendix. 
Then lightning struck. The court sua sponte "Recalled" its o�­
der denying rehearing en bane; later still the court granted what 1t 
had earlier denied. McBee was ordered reheard en bane with oral 
argument and on supplemental briefs.80 Obviously, something was 
brewing behind the scenes, probably some heavy judicial armtwist­
ing among the judges. In the living memory of the clerk's office, 
such procedural drama was unprecedented. At any event, at least 
eight of fourteen judges voted to rethink whether the first amend­
m ent should restrain a newly elected sheriff's desire to bring in his 
own political partisans. 
Judge Gee's opinion for the en bane court is masterful judicial 
statesmanship. It represents a lapidary balancing of interests that 
adjusts earlier tests, factors Connick v. Meyers into the analysis, 
and marshalls the weight of eleven circuit judges, including all 
m embers of the original McBee panel. Under the majority's view, 
the first amendment protects public employees in their political 
activities; they are free to talk politics and to campaign for candi­
dates of their choice. But if they should find themselves swept out 
of office because of their politics, they have no absolute or auto­
matic first amendment right to get their jobs back. It depends on 
the circumstances of each case, duly weighed and balanced, to wit: 
[t]he stanaard to be applied by us in resolving such public employee 
discharge or nonrenewal cases as this is the Pickering balancing test. 
Each case must be considered on its particular facts, sifting through 
such factors and circumstances as the Connick Court outlined in or­
der to strike the proper balance between the employee's speech and 
associational rights as citizen and the state's right as an employer to 
ord does not support the district court's conclusion that Ybanez' nonpolitical reasons 
f?r nonreappointment were merely "pretextual afterthoughts." . . .  [W]e do not be· 
heve that .plaintiffs proved their Elrod-Branti allegations. Moreover, we are even 
more . co�vmced that defendant would have so acted for reasons totally unrelated to const1tut10nally protected conduct. 
re 
8?· Reheari�g en bane was initially denied on June 2, 1983 (per Reavley, J .), the order 
C.
�allmg the de�ial of rehearing en_ bane was handed down on July 25, 
1983 (per Clark, 
. d
.), and rehearmg en bane was ultimately voted by at least eight of fourteen Fifth Circuit 
JU ges on August 12, 1983 (per curiam). 
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loyal and efficient service.e1 
Personal support for an individual candidate, the majority recog­
nized, goes beyond mere private political beliefs. 82 As a matter of 
law, the time, place, and especially the manner of a subordinate 
employee's support for the other side, are relevant factors to be 
weighed in the required first amendment balance. 
[t]he Constitution has not repealed human nature; and it is one 
thing to work with a subordinate who has expressed a reasoned pref­
erence for another superio r  and quite another to  have forced on 
one's organization an individual who has blackguarded one's honesty 
and ability up and down the county.83 
Judge Gee is careful not to reject entirely the panel's small county 
reasoning. Closeness of working relationships in a small sheriff's 
office is just one factor to be considered under the majority's new 
"comprehensive but flexible" analysis.84 That Jim Hogg County is 
small, however, is not an automatic, categorical b ar to public em­
ployee claims of retaliatory, politically motivated refusals to re­
hire.e11 The majority opinion cautions that "the 'closeness' of a 
working relationship as it affects job performance is not to be 
gauged merely by the size of the office or the n umber of employees. 
Rather, it is a function of the particular 'public responsibility' be­
ing carried out. "e6 
Following Branti, the court held that it makes no difference 
that the complaining deputies were terminated by a " 'failure to 
rehire' rather than a 'dismissal' "; this distinction is irrelevant to 
the question whether they were impermissibly terminated for exer­
cising their first amendment rights.87 It makes a big difference 
whether these deputies in fact asked the newly elected sheriff to be 
rehired. "Put another way, must a new sheriff consider for ap-
81. 730 F.2d at 1014. 
82. Id. at 1017: "[T]o the extent that the district court's analysis suggests that as a 
matter of law it will never be relevant to First Amendment inquiry whether the speech 
involved constitutes personal as distinguished from party political support, it stands cor­
rected by Connick and Gonzales." 
83. Id. 
84. "Connick, and Gonzales following it, read Pickering to require a comprehensive 
but flexible analysis-a balance which weighs the particular aspects of the government's 
interest in effective service and the plaintiffs' interest in freedom of speech that arise in 
each fact situation." Id. at 1016. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 1015 (citing Branti, 445 U.S. at 512 n.6). 
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pointed positions ex-employees who do not seek reinstatement? 
The First Amendment imposes n o  such obligation. "88 Having laid 
down its new balancing test, the en bane McBee court stopped 
short of resolving the merits, opting instead to vacate the district 
court's findings of fact-without approving or disapproving 
them-and to remand the record back to the trial court for re­
evaluation in light of the required "particularized inquiry. "89 
At this point the reader is invited to inspect the McBee opin­
ions in their entirety so as to get the full drift. I confess, were I the 
lower court on remand, I would be perplexed as to what to do with 
the "completely free hand " given me by the Fifth Circuit.90 Every­
thing seems up in the air. I mean no disrespect of either Judge 
Garza's or Judge Gee's opinions, which I have read and re-read. 
They are worthy efforts. Judge Gee is to be commended for his 
success at marshalling the court o n  what is a difficult problem with 
far-reaching implications. But duty as surveyor, as well as duty to 
the court, requires the suggestion here that the en bane majority 
opinion in McBee balances its reader all over the place. Constitu­
tional law is made of balancing, to be sure, but there is an outer 
limit here, as in the lapidary art. A diamond faceted out of propor­
tion loses its brilliance. 
Judge Tate, concurring only in the result, is all alone in stick-
ing to the original panel's small county rationale: 
In a small office like the present, of necessity there must be an inti­
mate relationship between the sheriff and his appointed staff, each 
of whom-in a small county context-will be regarded by the public 
(and the voters) as the alter ego of the new sheriff in all their official 
acts.91 
Judge Tate's bright line would foreclose the McBee plaintiffs' 
claims as a matter of law. To hold otherwise would effectively 
grant an incumbent deputy perpetual tenure so long as he actively 
supports his respective incumbent sheriff's reelection efforts. "I do 
not believe that the Elrod-Branti rationale intended that the First 
Amendment be used as a sword instead of a shield. "92 Some will 
88. 730 F.2d at 1015. 
89. Id. at 1017. 
90. "The panel determinations were automatically vacated by our grant of en bane 
consideration. In order that the district court may act with a completely free hand in apply­
ing this opinion, we vacate its findings also." Id. at 1016 n.18. 
91. Id. at 1026 (Tate, J., concurring in the result). 
92. Id. 
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say there is much practical wisdom in this special concurrence, es­
pecially those familiar with "the practical realities involved in the 
administration of a government office."93 But Judge Tate's views 
are not the law of this circuit. In defense of his isolated opinion, 
Judge Tate, undaunted, p ointed his finger at the views of the 
Fourth Circuit, which we all know is a flag to the Supreme Court. 94 
Now for the dissent: "Deep conviction and warm feeling are 
saying their last say with knowledge that the cause is lost. "9� Here, 
too, is work finely done in this case. Alvin Rubin's dissent on be­
half of Jimmie McBee has its own brilliance-"in the process of 
exposition he is practicing an art."9 6  Again, I leave the merits of 
the dissent to the reader, and to the Supreme Court should this 
kind of case ultimately be called up. I mean to say no more here 
than that I admire the style o f  the McBee dissent. Those who have 
given an hour to writing a single sentence will know what I mean. 
Judge Rubin's opening is p owerful prose: 
The spoils system, which views public employment as pure po­
litical patronage, inhibits the free functioning o f  the electoral pro­
cess . . . .  By holding a public employee's job hostage to his political 
activities or affiliation, the rebirth of the spoils system sanctioned by 
the majority allows an i ncumbent or a victorious challenger to ac­
complish indirectly what neither could legally d o  by mandate: the 
coercion of political support from the public e mployee. 
The first amendment protects a public employee when he ex­
presses and acts on political beliefs no less when he supports a los­
ing candidate than when he adheres to a losing political party. Its 
armor does not guard only "abstract political views" held in pectore 
or expressed by simple party affiliation: it protects the entire range 
of free expression of beliefs and actions so long as they do not ad­
versely affect the public employee's ability to perform his job 
efficiently.97 
Judge Rubin's analysis starts with the facts found by the district 
court, facts too quickly vacated under the majority's "rub it all out 
93. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. at 1694. 
94. The "small county" exception that Judge Tate would apply as a matter of law was 
first declared in dictum in Ramey v. Harber, 589 F.2d 753, 755-57 (4th Cir. 1978) , cert. 
denied, 442 U.S. 910 (1979), and then followed by the panel in McBee, 703 F.2d at 841 .  
95. B. CARDOZO, Law and Literature, in LAW AND LITERATURE AND OTHER ESSAYS AND 
ADDRESSES 3, 36 (1931). 
96. Id. at 40. 
97. 730 F.2d at 1017-18 (Rubin, J., dissenting). 
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and start over" app roach.98 The defendant sheriff admitted it was 
the custom in Jim Hogg County for a new sheriff to fire his prede­
cessor's staff; the defendant wanted "his people" in office; "politics 
was politics."99 The district court found the sheriff's asserted rea­
sons for not rehiring the plaintiff deputies were "pretextual after­
thoughts, offered to justify his political decisions." 100 On these 
facts, recovery s hould be allowed under Elrod-Branti: 
" [C] ontinued employment of deputy sheriffs and dispatchers can­
not properly be conditioned on their allegiance to a newly elected 
sheriff," Judge Rubin said. IOI "I cannot follow a distinction be­
tween abstract belief and party allegiance on the one hand and 
support of a candidate on the other, for i n  my opinion, the first 
amendment protects both."I02 Connick u. Myers, on which the ma­
jority hung its new balancing test, "does not take one whit from 
Elrod or Branti."I03 The reader may find it mysterious that Judge 
Higginbotham, the court's paragon Con nick balancer earlier in the 
term-recall Gonzalez u. Benavides-joined Judge Rubin's dissent 
in McBee. So did Judge Randall, another Gonzalez balancer. 
These three align themselves in McBee because 
[t]he distinction the majority opinion fails to acknowledge is that 
Elrod and Branti, like this case, involved retaliation for political be­
liefs and associations-free expression that did not threaten the effi­
cient conduct of public office unless the employees' position required 
political loyalty. Pickering, like Connick and similar pre-Connick 
cases, involved speech that arguably threatened the integrity of em­
ployer-employee relations, and therefore each case required the in­
terests to be balanced anew.Io4 
However, in the instant case, the replace d  persons were neither in­
subordinate nor incompetent. "The failure to rehire them squarely 
violated Elrod; it does not entail the factors considered in Picker-
. 98. Because we are neither legislators nor constitution-writers, but appellate JU�g�s, let us start, as all cases must, with the facts . . . .  Nothing in the majority 
opmion states that the district court factfindings are clearly erroneous, nor indeed, on 
the record
_ 
before us, could they be found in error. Yet the majority opinion vacates 
those findmgs · · · · Even when an appellate court remands for applic&tion of a new 
rule of I 't · t · h · 
· 
b 
. 
aw, 1 is no given t e option of disregarding the district court's fact-findings Y simply saying, "rub it all out and start over." Id. at 1018. 
99. Id. at 1018-19. 
100. Id. at 1019. 
1 0 1 .  Id. at 1020. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 1021. 
l04. Id. at 1022 (footnote omitted). 
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ing."105 The dissent goe.
s
. 
on to e��hasize t�� defendant sheriff's 
failure to show that political affihat10n was essential to the dis­
charge of the employee[s'] governmental responsibilities. '  "106 
Moreover, unlike Judge Tate, Judges Rubin, Randall, and Higgin­
botham are unwilling to assume as a m atter of law that a small 
sheriff's office "necessarily demands political fealty to function ef­
fectively. Sheriff Ybanez never even asserted that it did."107 No ev­
idence whatever established that plaintiffs' political associations in 
any way impaired their job efficiency. " 'As to the dispatchers, the 
Defendant made no showing of any kind why political loyalty was 
necessary for proper performance of their duties.' "108 And the dis­
senting opinion rejects any intimation that the first amendment is 
diluted when applied to public employees who happen to work in a 
one-party county: " The Constitution applies alike to Illinois and to 
Texas, to Cook County and to Jim Hogg County. Its standards do 
not vary with the size of governmental units or the supposed per­
ceptions of local voters. "109 
With respect to the two deputies who did not ask for rein­
statement, Judge Rubin's answer to the majority's cold shoulder is 
direct and, characteristically, anchored i n  the record: "We do not 
exact meaningless gestures. Application would have been futile 
. . . . [T]he established practice was to give jobs to the new sher­
iff's people. "110 One of the two deputies testified that the new sher­
iff " 'approached me and he stated that he was sorry, but politics 
was politics . . . that at a later date some thing might come up, 
but not under him.' "1 11 
With respect to Jimmie McBee, who was severed from a prom­
ised dispatcher's job because she complained to county officials 
about the new sheriff's patronage practices, the dissent agreed that 
the Pickering-Connick analysis applied. "But nothing in the ma­
jority opinion tells us how 'the balancing test' affects her claim. Its 
105. Id. 
l06. Id. "Once the district court found that the sole reason for Ybanez's failure to rehire the employees was his desire to staff the office with his 'own people,' the only issue was whether political affiliation was 'essential to the discharge of the employee[s'] govern­
mental responsibilities." Id. (quoting Branti, 445 U.S. at 518). 
107. 730 F.2d at 1023 (footnote omitted). 
108. Id. (quoting the district court's conclusion) (footnote omitted). 
109. Id. 
llO. Id. at 1023-24. On more than one occasion during the en bane McBee argument, Jud�e 
,
Rubin questioned counsel by specific reference, volume and page, to the record. Judge Rubin s dissent is built upon the same granite foundation. 
111. Id. at 1024 (emphasis in original). 
638 Loyola Law Review [Vol. 30:619 
application requires her reinstatement. " 1 1 2  McBee's protests in­
volved matters of public concern protected by the first amend­
m ent; she addressed them to appropriate offlcials on her own time 
and in a circumspect manner; she did not challenge Sheriff 
Ybanez's authority over her, attack him personally, or seek to fo­
ment public antipathy for his administration. "Her speech de­
serves protection n o t  only because it was free speech, but also be­
cause it was manifestly a petition for the redress of a grievance 
from the only governmental body able to afford relief."113  
In summing up, the dissent urged that " [a] rule that protects 
only abstract belie fs is almost meaningless. Abstract beliefs need 
little protection."114  At this point, Judge Rubin's sentences remind 
one of Mr. Justice J ackson's ringing prose-built of snap and go, 
infused with the glow of conviction. 1 16 "Words unspoken win no 
converts. Political beliefs cherished only in the mind win no elec­
tions," wrote Judge Rubin. 1 16 "The first amendment does not pro­
tect only freedom of belief or the use o f  words. It safeguards con­
duct that is part of freedom of expression."117  Judge Rubin wound 
up the dissent with an elegant peroration, or so it seems to this 
surveyor of judicial style:118 
Job sacrifice may not be exacted as a reprisal for the exercise of free 
expression. Today's decision makes possible just such retaliation. It 
undermines the first amendment bulwark of Elrod and Branti and 
threatens the firing of every public employee who does not support 
the incumbent if the incumbent wins, or who does not support the 
incumbent if he looses. Loss of a job may not constitutionally be 
made the price of attending-or failing to attend-a pachanga.119 
1 12. Id. 
113. Id. at 1025. 
114. Id. 
1 15. In fact, the dissent opens with one of Justice Robert Jackson's classic first 
amendment formulations: " 'If there is fi d t · · · · · · . . any xe s ar 1n our const1tut10nal constellat1on, 1t 1s that no official high or petty can pr ·b h t hall b · · · · · 
. 
. 
• 
, escn e w a s e orthodox m politics nat1onahsm 
rehg1on, or other matters of opin · f · · 
' 
· · 
' 
. ion or orce citizens to confess by word or act their faith ther�m.' " (730 F.2d at 101 '. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 ( 1943)). Mr. 
Justice Jackson wrote beautiful opinions. They teach the f b •t 
116. 730 F.2d at 1025. 
power o rev1 y. 
117. Id. 
1 18. All who make a living by d. 11 · · 
th ·t h d . 
rea mg appe ate opinions develop an eye for style and e wn er as ma e something of d · · 
' 
BAIER THE IDEA OF S A 
an aca emic specialty of his interest in the subject. See P. ' TYLE IN PPELLATE JUDICAL QpJ (2d d pared in connection with a se . . . NIONS e · 1977), a collection pre-
September 1977. 
mmar on wr1tmg for all Fifth Circuit law clerks, New Orleans, 
1 19. 730 F.2d at 1025 Jud R b. h d . . · ge u m a earlier m his dissent defined a "pachanga": 
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Surely this is beautiful writing, whatever one thinks substantively. 
I will add but a thought, a lawyer's reflection from the aca­
demic chair about the functioning of the Fifth Circuit as a whole in 
this case from Jim Hogg County, Texas. The case is an object les­
son in the pull and push of the judicial process and in the art of 
case analysis. Elrod and Branti are not self-defining solutions to 
the difficult problems presented. There is room here, as in most 
penumbra} cases, for judicial choice-for a legitimate difference of 
views-regarding the scope of the first amendment, weighed as 
some would weigh it against the competing demands of executive 
discretion in a representative democracy.120 What I'm trying to say 
here has been said much better by another law teacher who has 
also learned from seeing a real writ.121 Professor Cox was talking 
about the Supreme Court, but I believe his words fit the Fifth Cir­
cuit as I have seen it adjudicating fighting cases: 
But my view is deeply prejudiced. One who has sat in the Su­
preme Court almost daily awaiting oral argument or the delivery of 
opinions acquires both admiration and affection for the Court and 
for all the justices. The problems with which they deal are so diffi­
cult, the number and variety of cases are so overwhelming, the im­
plications are so far-reaching, that one sits humbled by the demands 
upon them. That the institution of constitutional adjudication works 
so well on the whole is testimony not only to the genius of the insti­
tution but to the wisdom and courage of the individual justices. 1 11 
So it is with our own Fifth Circuit, sitting e n  bane, adjudging Jim­
mie McBee's case. 
"The campaign was spirited. Each candidate sponsored parades and rallies, locally called 
'pachangas.' " Id. at 1018. , 
120. Or as Dean Griswold explained it during a television interview: "Now it will al­
ways be true that there are borderlines, and-to use an unfortunate word-'penumbras,' 
where it is doubtful as to just what the law is." A Life Lived Greatly in the Law: Erwin N. 
Griswold (WLSU T.V. 1980, P.R. Baier Producer) (interview with former Solicitor General 
and Dean of the Harvard Law School). 
121. Compare the remark of Frederick Pollock, in a letter to Holmes written in 1924: 
"Both from my own experience and from information I believe students' main trouble is to 
make out the connexion of the book-law they are examined in with the live business of the 
Courts." Frederick Pollock to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Feb. 1 1 ,  1924, in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK 
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-
1932, at 127 (M.D. Howe ed. 1946). Holmes answered Pollock's letter saying: "I quite under­
stand the difficulties of connecting the books with life. I remember a chap who had just left 
the Law School writing to another that he had seen a real writ (or deed, I forget).'' Oliver 
Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock, March 7, 1924, id. at 128. 
122. A. Cox, THE w ARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF RE· 
FORM 134 (1968). 
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LIQUOR ADVERTISING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Presumably Congress thought suppressing cigarette advertis­
ing would cut down on trips to the graveyard, so pursuant to the 
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,123 Congress made 
the Marlboro Man a television outlaw. Broadcasters said the fed­
eral ban violated the first amendment, but the Supreme Court 
summarily affirmed a lower court ruling upholding the federal 
ban. 124 This was 1972, when it was still the rule that "purely com­
mercial advertising"12� enjoyed no first amendment protection, a 
view which has since "passed from the scene."128 
Liquor advertising reached the Fifth Circuit last term in La­
mar Outdoor Advertising,127 wherein the court, applying recent 
"commercial speech" developments, notably Central Hudson Gas 
& Electric ,128 struck down Mississippi's ban on intrastate liquor 
ads. The panel reasoned that "there is no 'hazardous product' ex­
ception to the First Amendment nor could there well be without 
destroying the commercial speech doctrine."129 Judges Gee, 
Goldberg, and Higginbotham concluded that 
Mississippi has introduced nothing in this case which convinces us 
that its intrastate advertising ban has any appreciable affect on li­
quor consumption in light of the state's saturation with ads from 
out-of-state sources. Accordingly, the ban has not been shown di­
rectly to advance public health and safety. Indeed, we think at best 
it provides "ineffective" and "remote" support for the state's 
purpose.130 
This sounds very much like the freewheeling judicial review of 
Lochner v. New York: "We do not believe in the soundness of the 
123. Pub. L. No. 9 1-222, 84 Stat. 89 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982)), which, in 
pertinent part provides: "After January 1, 1971, it shall be unlawful to advertise cigarettes 
. . . on any medium of electronic communication subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Communications Commission." 
124. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge 
court), aff'd mem. , 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). 
125. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 ( 1 942). 
126. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 759 (1976). 
127. Lamar Outdoor Advertising v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, 701 F.2d 314 (5th 
Cir. 1983). 
128. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
129. 701 F.2d at 324. 
130. Id. at 333. 
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views which uphold this law."131 Again: "In our judgment it is not 
possible in fact to discover the connection between the number of 
hours a baker may work in the bakery and the healthful quality of 
the bread made by the workman."132 And more: " [l]t is apparent 
that the public health or welfare bears but the most remote rela­
tion to the law."133 Presumably Mississippi believes its advertising 
ban reduces liquor consumption within the state, but its marketing 
views were not shared by the advertisers' expert, a sociologist spe­
cializing in alcoholism, who testified that liquor advertising only 
affects brand loyalty and market share, not consumption. 134 The 
district judge, helieving plaintiffs' expert, found as a fact that Mis­
sissippi "failed to produce concrete scientific evidence"135 to sub­
stantiate its marketing position. In turn, as we have seen, the La­
mar Advertising panel set itself up as a super-liquor control board 
for the State of Mississippi. Although recognizing that "our power 
to strike down state laws as unconstitutional is strong 
medicine,"136 the panel administered its lethal dose straight away, 
saying "we are convinced that our decision, though difficult, is re­
quired by the Constitution and the law."137 Curiously, at the time 
the Lamar opinion was handed down, the Tenth Circuit had 
reached precisely the opposite conclusion regarding Oklahoma's li­
quor laws. 138 Since the panel opinion initiated a conflict with an­
other circuit, it was circulated to all active Fifth Circuit judges; an 
en bane poll was requested and the case was voted reheard en 
banc.139 The panel opinion was vacated the same day it was 
131. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905). 
132. Id. at 62. Mr. Justice Peckham added: "The connection, if any exits, is too shad-
owy and thin to build any argument for the interference of the legislature." Id. 
133. Id. at 64. 
134. 539 F. Supp. 817, 822 (S.D. Miss. 1982). 
135. Id. at 829. The district court relied on plaintiff's expert, Dr. David Pittman, 
chairman and professor of Sociology at Washington University, specializing in alcoholism 
and alcoholic abuse, who testified that "no credible scientific evidence exists to support De­
fendant's theory that increased alcoholic beverage advertising leads to increased consump­
tion." Id. at 821-22. 
136. 701 F.2d at 333. 
137. Id. 
138. Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983), reu'd on 
other grounds sub nom. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S: Ct. 2694 (1984). 
139. Since initiating a conflict with another circuit is not to be undertaken lightly, the 
Fifth Circuit has a policy of circulating conflict-initiating opinions to the entire Court before 
their release, with the possibility of rehearing en bane being voted. This serves as a strategic 
checking device on any panel's going overboard. For a citation of the policy, see the opening 
note to Judge Gee's panel opinion in Lamar Outdoor Advertising, 701 F.2d at 3 16 (asterisk 
note). Rehearing en bane was ordered in Lamar on the court's own motion, 701 F.2d 335 
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handed down-truly a hol low victory for the liquor interests. Mis­
s issippi was smi lin g . 
The second time around Mississippi won its case, with a ma­
jority of the judges stating: 
We conclude that the advertising ban is sufficiently justified to 
pass constitutional muster. We simply do not belie
_
v� that the liquor 
industry spends a b illion dollars a year on ad vert1sm� solely to ac-
quire an added market share at the expense of competitors .
. . .
. . 
[W]e hold that sufficient reason exists to believe that advert1smg 
and consumption are linked to justify the ban, whether or not " con­
crete scientific evidence" exists to that effect. uo 
This, too, sounds like Lochner; the court is making up its own 
mind whether "the regulation directly advances the governmental 
interest asserted,m41 which is the crux o f  Centra l Hudson 's four­
part analysis as app lied to this case. Nobody doubts M ississippi's 
substantial interest in outlawing liquor in its dry counties. And the 
majority is willing to assume "that liquor advertising in Mississippi 
should be treated at the outset as protected commercial speech."142 
Rather, the judges are divided on the q uestion whether legislative 
means fit legislative ends. 
In considering whether Mississippi's advertising ban "directly" 
reduced consumption, the majority judges, relying on what they 
know as men, took a bold stance: "It is beyond our ability to un­
derstand why huge sums of money would be devoted to the promo­
tion of sales of liquor without expected results . . . . Money talks: 
it talks to the young and the old about what counts in the market­
place of our society, and it talks here i n  support of Mississippi's 
concerns."148 Judge Reavley's discussion in his en bane majority 
opinion of the degree to which an appellate court should defer to 
the " fact" findings of the trial judge as to the latest truths in the 
social sciences is deeply perceptive: 
/ 
(1983) (per curiam).  
140. Dunagi� v. City of Oxford, Mississippi, 7 1 8  F.2d 738, 750 (5th Cir. 1983) (en 
bane). Th� Dunagin case and_ Lamar Outdoor Advertising were argued and decided together on rehearmg en bane. They mvolved the same first amendment question and the d istrict 
c?ur�.
s below h�d reached �p.posite con�lusions regarding the constituti�nality of Missis­s1pp1 s ban on_ liquor advertismg. Dunagm v. City of Oxford, 489 F. Supp. 763 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (upholdmg); Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 539 F. Supp. at 817 (invalidating). 1 4 1 .  447 U.S. at 566. 
142. 718 F.2d at 747. 
143. Id. at 749. 
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[T)he issue of whether there is a correlation between advertising 
and consumption is  a legislative and not an adjudicative fact ques­
tion. It is . . .  a question of social factors and happenings which may 
submit to some partial empirical solution but is likely to remain 
subject to opinion and reasoning . . . . That reasoning is the respon­
sibility of legislators and judges, assisted by scholars as well as social 
scientists. The specific issue here was undoubtedly considered by 
the Mississippi Legislature when local option and the curtailment of 
liquor consumption were being studied . . . .  If the legislative deci­
sion is not binding at this stage, at least it carries great weight. Cer­
tainly it cannot be thrust aside by two experts and a judicial trier of 
fact. 144 
Judge Reavley's fine-print deserves wider attention than I fear it 
will receive. 14� His footnote 8, both in form and substance, echoes 
144. Id. at 748 n.8. 
145. Footnote 8 fills four columns of 7 1/2 -point type, and it is set out here, edited only 
slightly, for the benefit of law students, constitutional theorists, and others who may read 
these pages: 
The writings and studies of social science experts on legislative facts are often 
considered and cited by the Supreme Court with or without introduction into the 
record or even consideration by the trial court. E.g., Barefoot v. Estelle (validity of 
predictions of violent behavior); New York v. Ferber (the effect upon the child used 
as a subject for pornographic materials); Ballew v. Georgia (effect of the size of jury 
upon deliberation and verdict); Gregg v. Georgia (the deterrent effect of capital pun­
ishment); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slayton (the relation between obscenity and so­
cially deleterious behavior); Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (the effect of 
segregation upon minority children). 
Furthermore, the decision on whether a regulation of commercial speech directly 
advances the state's interest, for example, is an exercise of constitutional adjudication 
wherein appellate courts play a special role. Applying the legal tests that have 
evolved in constitutional law invariably requires subtle legal distinctions, a sense of 
history, and an ordering of conflicting rights, values and interests. The Supreme 
Court has often warned that each First Amendment case must be analyzed sepa­
rately, based on the particular method of communication involved, and the values 
and dangers implicated. "The protection available for particular commercial expres­
sion turns on the nature both of the expression and of the government interests 
served by its regulation." Central Hudson Gas. The questions raised in such cases 
involve mixed questions of law and fact . . . . 
There are limits to which important constitutional questions should hinge on the 
views of social scientists who testify as experts at trial. Suppose one trial judge sitting 
in one state believes a sociologist who has found no link between alcohol abuse and 
advertising, while another trial judge sitting in another state believes a psychiatrist 
who has reached the opposite conclusion. A similar situation aetually occurred here. 
Should identical conduct be constitutionally protected in one jurisdiction and illegal 
in another? Should the fundamental principles of equal protection delivered in 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka be questioned if the sociological studies re­
garding racial segregation set out in the opinion's footnote 11 are shown to be meth­
odologically flawed? Should the constitutionality of the property tax as a means of 
financing public education, resolved in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
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the artistry and judicial sensibility of Mr. Justice Brandeis, who 
also stressed the limited role of courts in second-guessing state leg­
islatures on questions of breadbaking or alcoholics.146 I can't help 
Rodriguez, depend on the prevailing views of educators and sociologists as to the 
existence of a cost-quality relationship in education? Does capital punishment be­
come cruel and unusual when the latest regression models demonstrate a lack of de­
terrence? The social sciences play an important role in many fields, including the law, 
but other unscientific values, interests and beliefs are transcendent. 
Perhaps for these reasons, the Supreme Court's recent commercial speech and 
other relevant speech cases indicate that appellate courts have considerable leeway in 
deciding whether restrictions on speech are justified. In none of them did the Court 
rely heavily on fact findings of the trial court. 
Id. at 748-49 n.8 (citations omitted). 
146. On breadbaking, see Justice Brandeis's classic dissent in Jay Burns Baking Co. v. 
Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 519-20, 533-34 (1924); 
The determination of these questions involves an [e]nquiry into facts. Unless we 
know the facts o n  which the legislators may have acted, we cannot properly decide 
whether they were (or whether their measures are) unreasonable, arbitrary or capri­
cious. Knowledge is essential to understanding; and understanding should precede 
judging. Sometimes, if we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds 
be bold. But, in this case, we have merely to acquaint ourselves with the art of 
breadmaking and the usages of the trade . . . . 
Much [of the] evidence referred to by me is not in the record. Nor could it have 
been included. It is the history of the experience gained under similar legislation 
. . . . Of such events in our history, . . .  the Court should acquire knowledge, and 
must, in my opinion, take judicial notice, whenever required to perform the delicate 
judicial task here involved . . . .  The evidence contained in the record in this case is, 
however, ample to sustain the validity of the statute. There is in the record some 
evidence in conflict with it. The legislature and the lower courts have, doubtless, con­
sidered that. But with this conflicting evidence we have no concern. It is not our 
province to weigh evidence. Put at its highest, our function is to determine, in the 
light of all facts which may enrich our k nowledge and enlarge our understanding, 
whether the measure, enacted in the exercise of an unquestioned police power and of 
a character inherently unobjectionable, transcends the bounds of reason . . . . 
To decide, as a fact, that the prohibition of excess weights "is not n ecessary for 
the protection of the purchasers against imposition and fraud by short weights"; that 
it "is not calculated to effectuate that purpose"; and that it "subjects bakers and 
sellers of bread" to heavy burdens, is, in my opinion, an exercise of the powers of a 
super-legislature-not the performance of the constitutional function of judicial 
review. 
On alcoholics, see Justice Brandeis's opinion, painstakingly footnoted, in Jacob Ruppert 
v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 299 (1920): 
The police power of a State over the liquor traffic is not limited to the power to 
prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors supported by a separate implied power to 
prohibit kindred non-intoxicating liquors so far as necessary to make the prohibition 
of intoxicants effective; it is a single broad power to make such laws, by way of prohi­
bition, as may be required to effectively suppress the traffic in intoxicating liquors. 
The footnotes in Jacob Ruppert, from note (a) to (n) are really quite amazing, and all law 
clerks, as a condition of employment, should be required by their judges to marvel at the 
annotation artistry evident in the work of Brandeis and his legal secretary, Dean Acheson, 
who was Brandeis's law clerk at the time. As recollected by Mr. Acheson; 
He wrote the opinion; I wrote the footnotes. 
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believing that Louis Brandeis, who valued free speech above beer, 
would have scoffed at the idea that outlawing Budweiser commer­
cials violates the first amendment. The trouble is that the current 
Court has extended the first amendment beyond Justice Brandeis's 
ascetic vision of "freedom of expression,"147 and empty beer cans 
are everywhere. 
Judge Williams's special concurrence objected to the major­
ity's reliance on the twenty-first amendment: "I view the doctrine 
as mischievous and insidious."148 The purpose of that amendment, 
he said, has "nothing whatsoever to do with encroachment upon 
the individual liberties protected in the Constitution,"149 although 
in fairness to the m ajority, Judge Williams conceded that the Su­
preme Court has intimated the contrary.150 The concurrence pre-
My footnotes up to that time were the Mount Everest of footnotes. Today, Jus­
tices of the Supreme Court write textbooks as marginal annotations of their opinions, 
but up to that time I had written the greatest footnotes, fifteen pages of footnotes. 
And what were we trying to do? We were collecting all the legislation and all the 
decisions of the forty-eight states and the Territories of the United States as to what 
was an intoxicating beverage. The purpose of this, of  course, was to show that when 
the Congress said "one half of one per cent of alcohol by volume is intoxicating," that 
that was reasonable, because all the states had said everything in the world beside 
that. And compared to the confusion of the states, this was Reason Incarnate. So I 
went to work on the opinion. 
Acheson, Recollections of Service with the Federal Supreme Court, 18 A.LA. LAW. 355, 364-
65 (1957). 
There is one more Brandeis opinion on alcoholics that should be noted here, by way of 
capturing his attitude toward liquor vis-a-vis Congress: 
High medical authority being in conflict as to the medicinal value of spiritous and 
vinous liquors taken as a beverage, it would, indeed, be strange if Congress lacked the 
power to determine that the necessities of the liquor problem require a limitation of 
permissible prescriptions, as by keeping the quantity that may be prescribed within 
limits which will minimize the temptation to resort to prescriptions as pretexts for 
obtaining liquor for beverages uses. 
Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 597 (1926). 
147. Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 
(1927), the locus classicus of Brandeis's vision of the first amendment, says nothing about 
advertising; rather, it speaks of the first amendment as a means to the discovery of political 
truth: 
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to 
make men free to develop their faculties, and that in its government the deliberative 
forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a 
means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the 
secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you 
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth . 
Id. at 375. 
148. 718 F.2d at 754 (Williams, J., concurring). 
149. Id. 
150. See, e.g., New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981); Califor­
nia v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 ( 1972). 
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fers to peg state control of liquor advertising squarely on the police 
power. "It does not depend to any d egree upon the Twenty-first 
amendment. "11n However, in recognizing the special problems re­
lated to liquor regulation, Judge Williams had no difficulty agree­
ing that Mississippi's ban of liquor a dvertising does not violate the 
first amendment. "To hold otherwise exhalts commercialism above 
the genuine concerns the State of Mississippi has a right to feel for 
its citizens, and the problems that liquor creates in our society."152 
Judge Williams added a word about the "battle of experts" below: 
"What this battle of the experts was actually asking us to do was 
to engage in the now outmoded substantive economic due process 
analysis. The fact that there was a battle of the experts on this 
issue proved that the issue was one of legislative policy."i113 If Mis­
sissippi believes liquor advertising increases consumption, "that is 
a legislative judgment that it has a right to make. " i 11• 
Judge Gee's graceful dissent quietly stuck to his panel opin­
ion.166 Judge Higginbotham also abid e d  by the panel decision, but 
he threw out a thunderbolt worthy of consideration in the next 
constitutional law seminar: 
The immediate turn of this case in the long view of constitu­
tional principle has little significance. The case may be little more 
than how judges view whiskey, or how judges apply their own no­
tions of what is a good and what is a bad law. This intended exag­
geration is a sufficiently accurate description of this type of judicial 
re�ie� that we are he�itant �o cheerfully admit engaging in. The 
pomt is that the balancmg of mterests exercise of Virginia Board of 
Pharmacy and its younger companions reduces the exaggeration to 
an uncomfortable level. 
Nevertheless, the cases instruct that we are to so review and I 
am reluctan.t to express my own doubts, which go to the very notion of commercial speech, by applying those cases in a less than faithful 
151. 718 F.2d at 754. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. The Gee dissent is short and gentlemanly: 
Judge Reavley's opinion fo · ·t f h 
as always-takes a view of the 
r � �aJ?n '! 0 t e court-workmanlike and thorough 
with which it is h d t d' 
Mis�issippi arrangement regulating liquor advertising 
expressed in our p:nel 
0 .is?gree violently. Even so, I believe that the better one is 
set out in great detail 
:pinions, repo:ted at 7?1 F.2d 314 and 335. Since it is there 
Id. at 755 (G J d' 
' . see no occasion to write further. ee, ., issentmg). 
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way. Doing so substitutes one brand of activism for another. 
. . . Of course we are Lochnerizing and intruding into the affairs of 
a state. I suggest that distaste for the intrusion has created a reluc­
tance in actual application to give full sway to the commercial 
speech doctrine as developed by the Supreme Court, and was an un­
identified hand on the weighing scale of the majority; that it was 
this added weight which separated the majority and dissenting 
opinions. 
It is hard for me to see that Mississippi has "won" this case. It 
can ban the advertising of whiskey, true enough, but only because 
federal judges answerable to no voters have decided that they 
"agree" with the Mississippi legislature. In the long haul this is no 
win at all. That seems to me to be a predictable, if not inevitable, 
consequence of the doctrine itself. This exaggerates, but it is suffi­
ciently accurate that we ought to be troubled. I am.156 
It is tempting, from the point of view of theory, to discourse at 
length on this liquor-speech case. A professor might want to ex­
plain Mississippi's success to his students on some basis other than 
how judges view whiskey ads. But this is not the place to trace the 
encrustation of commercial speech · on the Constitution generally, 
or to propose a clean scrapping. It is enough here to sample the 
Fifth Circuit's yeoman service, and to point out that the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari without a higher word. 157 
VOTING RIGHTS, CONGRESS, AND THE COURTS 
The interplay between Congress and the courts on the matter 
of protecting voting rights is an old theme. South Carolina v. Kat­
zenbach 158 comes to mind. In that case, a younger Charles Clark, 
Esq. , playing the lawyer's part, submitted on the briefs that "Con­
gress exceeded the limits of the Constitution in enacting the V ot­
ing Rights Act of 1965. ,,.69 During his oral argument as amicus cu­
riae for Mississippi, Clark told Chief Justice Warren and the other 
members of the Supreme Court: 
156. Id. (Higginbotham, J., concurring in the dissenting opinion). 
157. Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, 104 S. Ct. 
3554 (1984). 
158. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
159. Brief for the State of Mississippi, Amicus Curiae at 6, South Carolina v. Katzen­
bach, 383 U.S. at 301, reprinted in 62 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 587, 601 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 
1975) [hereinafter cited as LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS). 
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This is not to say that the entire Act must go out, and certainly 
not Your Honor Mr. Justice Black, it's not to say that Congress 
can
1
't enforce the
' 
Fifteenth Amendment. But it is to demand that 
that enforcement be appropriate legislation, and it cannot be appro­
priate if it doesn't square with the d?cument . . . .  And if ?ongress 
can ride roughshod over you, there s no need to have this Court 
. . . .  That's not what Article III established this Court for. It is 
established it to give you the opportunity to call any department of 
the Government to account if it left the bounds of the document we 
all swore to uphold and support and def end. 160 
Chief Justice Warren, we know, sustained the constitutionality 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 181 Charles Clark, like the rest of 
us, knew defeat as a lawyer.182 "As against the reserved powers of 
the States," Chief Justice Warren said in South Carolina v. Kat­
zenbach, "Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the 
constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting. "183 
Fifteen years later, in Mobile v. Bolden, 184 the fifteenth amend­
ment was read to prohibit only purposeful, invidious discrimina­
tory denials of voting rights on account of race. Discriminatory ef­
fects alone were not enough to violate section 1 of the fifteenth 
amendment; nor had Congress intended, said the Court, to outlaw 
voting practices that produced discriminatory results without re­
gard to invidious purpose. Congress reacted swiftly to the Court's 
statutory construction, amending the Voting Rights Act so as to 
160. Oral Argument of Charles Clark, Esq., on Behalf of the State of Mississippi as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, reprinted in 62 
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 159, at 741, 742-43. The writer has listened 
to the sound recordings of the oral arguments in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, which are 
prese�ed on tape, as are all Supreme Court oral arguments, at the National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. There is conviction and sincerity in the younger Clark's voice. 
l61. Chief Justice Warren wound up his opinion for the Court, 383 U.S. at 337, with a 
holding and a hope: 
We
_ 
here hold that the portions of the Voting Rights Act properly before us are a 
va
_
h� means for carrying out the commands of the Fifteenth Amendment. Hopefully, 
millions of n?n:white Americans will now be able to participate for the first time on 
an equal basis m the government under which they live. We may finally look forward 
to t�e day wh�n truly "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
dem� or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race color or previous· condition of servitude." ' ' 
l62· 
. 
He also knows a high compliment from the bench: "Without exception, despite the emotional overtones of the d" h b · 1 l "k d 
procee mg, t e r1efs and oral arguments were temperate, 
tit 1 e an constructive." South Carolina v. Katzenback, 383 U.S. at 308 (per Warren, 
l 63. ld. at 324. 
Cir. !�s).446 U.S. 55 (l980), rev'g Bolden v. City of Mobile, Alabama, 571 F.2d 238 (5th 
1984] Constitutional Law 649 
outlaw any voting practice that "results in" a denial or abridge­
ment of the right to vote on the account of race or color. 16� In Jor­
dan v. City of Greenwood, Mississippi,166 the first case to reach the 
court under the Voting Rights Act amendments of 1982, the Fifth 
Circuit noted this term that " [t] his change from purpose to effect 
represents a significant legislative departure from the theory on 
which Bolden was decided. "167 The district court, applying Mobile 
v. Bolden, searched for and found no forbidden discriminatory ani­
mus behind the city's at-large commission form of government. 
The primary issue on appeal was the intervention of the new vot­
ing rights amendments. Greenwood, Mississippi, urged the Fifth 
Circuit to hold that Congress had exceeded its enforcement power 
under section 2 of the fifteenth amendment since "a law that pros­
cribes unintentional denial of voting rights is neither necessary nor 
appropriate to effectuate constitutional provisions that proscribe 
only intentional discrimination. "168 A cold reading of sections 1 
and 2 of the fifteenth amendment indicates a certain surface logic 
to this argument. On the other hand, plaintiffs and the United 
States, as amicus curiae, urged the court to uphold the new voting 
rights law as a valid exercise of Congress' extensive power to en­
force the Civil War amendments. Here, plainly, was an opportunity 
for article III judges to call Congress to account "if it left the 
bounds of the document we all swore to uphold and support and 
defend. "169 
This time, not as lawyer but as Chief Judge of the Fifth Cir­
cuit, Charles Clark declined the opportunity to call Congress to ac­
count: "[W]e take a path not urged by anyone. We decline to reach 
the question whether new section 2 is constitutional, vacate the 
judgment of the district court, and remand for further proceed­
ings."170 Chief Judge Clark's opinion shows remarkable-indeed 
classical-restraint. More active judges, I suspect, might have 
jumped at the chance to flex article III muscle. But the panel 
stayed its hand because " [i]f there is one doctrine more deeply 
rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, 
it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality 
165. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(a) (West Supp. 1984). 
166. 711 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1983). 
167. Id. at 669. 
168. Id. 
169. Oral Argument of Charles Clark, Esq., supra note 160. 
170. 711 F.2d at 669. 
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. . .  unless such adjudication is unavoidable. "11 1 Here, again, is evi­
dence of Justice Brandeis's continuing influence, this time with re­
spect to his Ashwander counsel of restraint. 112 S ince this voting 
case could go off on remand on statutory grounds, that is, "should 
the district court find that Greenwood's scheme does not violate 
new section 2, the constitutional issue would become moot. If this 
occurs, our restraint will have avoided the needless resolution of an 
important constitutional question. "173 Doubtless, Charles Clark's 
sensitivity to "the important question of constitutional law 
presented by this appealm74 was forged earlier in life, in  another 
courtroom, in another role. 
Later in the term, in Jones v. City of Lu bbock, 1711 another 
panel of the court was asked to call Congress to account, and this 
time decision was unavoidable. The challenge to Lubbock's at­
large system of election to city council turned on discriminatory 
results rather than invidious purpose. The case arose after passage 
of the voting rights amendm ents; the constitutionality of new sec­
tion 2 of the Voting Rights Act was squarely presented, and 
squarely decided. Outlawing voting practices that produce discrim­
inatory results, even in the absence of proof of discriminatory in­
tent, fits within Congress' power "to enforce this article by appro­
priate legislation."176 Judge Randall's opinion is characteristically 
thorough and, on the constitutional question presented, tight as a 
closed vise. She dispatched the city's argument that Congress 
usurped the judicial province forthwith: 
Section 2 does not purport to usurp the judicial role of defining the 
substantive scope of the fourteenth amendment or the fifteenth 
amendment. Instead, Congress seeks to protect the core values of 
these amendments through a remedial scheme that invalidates elec­
tion systems that, although constitutionally permissible, might de­
base the amendments' guarantees. Congressional power to adopt 
prophylactic measures to vindicate the purposes of the fourteenth 
and fifteenth amendments is unquestioned [citing, inter alia, South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach]. So long as Congress adopts lawfull and ra-
171. Id. (quoting Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944) (per 
Frankfurter, J.)). 
172: Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 ( 1 936) (Brandeis, J., concurrmg). 
173. 711 F.2d at 669. 
174. Id. at 670. 
175. 727 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1984). 
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 
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tional means to enforce the constitution, the separation of powers 
doctrine requires that the judiciary, rather than Congress, must 
defer.177 
The basic test to b e  applied in cases requiring judges to review 
Congress's exercises of its enforcement powers "is the same as in 
all cases concerning the express powers of Congress with relation 
to the reserved powers of the States."178 The locus classicus, of 
course, is Chief Justice Marshall's formulation, laid down fifty 
years before the fifteenth amendment was ratified, in McCulloch v. 
Maryland: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of 
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adapted to that end, which are not p rohibited, but consist 
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional. "179 
Judge Randall rehearsed the legislative history behind the voting 
rights amendments. Congress heard extensive testimony showing 
that minority voting rights still suffered from the effects of past 
discriminatory electoral systems. Congress knew that proving dis­
criminatory "intent" is a tricky thing; there was ample documenta­
tion of the failure of the intent test to remedy past abuses; Con­
gress perceived the need for ameliorating the statutory burden of 
proof. "Acting on this record, Congress, in our view, could appro­
priately determine that a 'results' test was necessary to enforce  the 
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. Assigning a non-intent stan­
dard to an enforcement measure does not pose a serious constitu­
tional obstacle."180 
Judge Randall next canvassed the transformation of voting 
rights law during the seven years Jones v. City of Lubbock was in 
the courts. Her opinion is a small treatise of large learning, a first­
rate vade mecum on judicial construction-and re-construc­
tion-of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 
As amended, the test is one of "results." Proof of violation is 
established under the new subsection (b) 
if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the politi­
c al processes leading to nomination or election in the State or politi­
cal subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of 
a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that 
177. 727 F.2d at 373-74 (citations omitted). 
178. 383 U.S. at 326. 
179. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat); 316, 421 (1819). 
180. 727 F.2d at 375. 
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its members have less opportunity than other members of the elec­
torate to participate in the political process and to elect representa­
tives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected 
class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision 
is one circumstance that may be considered. Provided, that nothing 
in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected 
class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the 
population. 181 
Just what this language means when read as a whole is cloudy. 
Senator Mathias said the goal was "to give all citizens equal access 
to vote, run, or otherwise participate in the process. "182 Senator 
Hatch asked "What does 'equal access' mean?"183 
SENATOR HATCH: Is [it] the most fair and just means to 
achieve access-if 55 percent of Baltimore is black then 55 percent 
ought to be black majority districts? 
SENATOR MATHIAS: You look at the totality of circum­
stances; that is what we have been doing. 
SENATOR HATCH: I do not understand what the question is 
that the Court asks itself in evaluating the totality of the circum­
stances under the results test. What precisely does the Court ask 
itself after it has looked at the totality of circumstances? What is 
the standard for evaluation under the results test? 
SENATOR MATHIAS: Look at the results. 
SENATOR HATCH: That is all? You are saying that if there 
was absolutely no intent to discriminate, as the Court found in the 
Mobile case, yet the results were the election of disproportionately 
few minority candidates, that a case would be established? How 
would this effect a case such as that raised in Baltimore?184 
Notably, this Senatorial exchange took place before the Dole dis­
claimer of proportional representation was added to the bill.185 
Quite obviously, Congress strattled the fence here, politically com­
promising a burning issue and leaving it up to the federal courts to 
181. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(b) (West Supp. 1984). 
182. Hearings on the Voting Rights Act Before the Senate Subcommittee on the Con-
stitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 201 (1982). 
183. Id. 
184. Id . 
. 185. "T�e Dole proposal effectively supplied a political resolution to misgivings about section 2. It did not, however, put to rest the considerable confusion over what the compro­mise ultimately was intended to mean." Boyd & Markman The 1982 Amendments to the Votings Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LE� L. REv. 1347, 1416 (1983). 
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say what it is that Congress intended in the heat of June 1982.188 
One thing is clear. The Fifth Circuit has come down on Lub­
bock, affirming the district court's finding that Lubbock's at-large 
election for city council violates section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
as amended. 
The panel in "constru[ing] the statute s o  as to give it mean-
ing"187 has itself walked a tightrope: 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act requires that we give effect to 
two commands. On one hand, we cannot uphold the Lubbock elec­
tion scheme if it inflicts a discriminatory result so severe that the 
plaintiffs have lost equal access to the political process. On the other 
hand, the factors demonstrating a discriminatory result must 
amount to more than mere judicial enforcement of proportional 
representation.188 
Everybody votes in Lubbock, but no minority candidate has ever 
been elected to the city council. "Without a breakdown in the pat­
tern of polarized voting, no minority candidate is ever likely to 
serve on an at-large city council,"189 said the panel, giving special 
weight to the factor of polarized voting, which was found by the 
district court to have pervaded Lubbock's election processes. Al­
though there was evidence of responsiveness to minority interests 
on Lubbock's part, "the absence of unresponsiveness does not ne­
gate [the] other inferences that flow from polarization. "190 Lub­
bock's at-large system "does not become unlawful merely because 
186. Messrs. Boyd and Markman, who were "on the Hill" when the 1982 amendments 
were adopted, wind up their painstaking rehearsal of the legislative history, supra note 185, 
at 1428, this way: 
As so often happens in complex legislative matters, particularly where highly 
charged emotional issues are involved, the federal judiciary will ultimately have to 
tell Congress what it intended to achieve in its 1982 Amendments to sections 2 and 5. 
Indeed, the very constitutionality of these provisions will be the subject of considera­
ble debate in the courts in the years ahead. While some compromises promote stabil­
ity of the law, others merely postpone difficult policy decisions. The undeniably sub­
stantial controversies involved in the Voting Rights Act debate must finally be 
resolved; when they are, they will contribute in great measure toward a definition of 
the objectives of civil rights policy in the United States for the next generation. 
Query whether Congress' pitching this hot political potato to the courts is consistent with 
separation of powers? 
187. 727 F.2d at 373. But compare Mr. Justice Jackson's comment, dissenting in 
United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 635 (1954): "Judicial construction, constitutional or 
statutory, always is subject to hazards of judicial reconstruction." 
188. 727 F.2d ai 384. 
189. Id. at 383. 
190. Id. at 381. 
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it disadvantages a d iscrete and insular minority, " 1 9 1  the panel ac­
knowledged. "Even where an at-large system interacts with a ra­
cially or ethnically polarized electorate to the disadvantage of the 
minority, the 'result '  is not necessarily a denial of political ac­
cess. "192 The crucial inquiry under the amended act is "whether 
the electoral system, in light of its present effects and historical 
context, treats minorities so unfairly that they effectively lose ac­
cess to the political processes. "193 O bj ective factors, "fiexi bly"194 
weighed, "will distinguish an unlawful e lectoral system in which 
considerations of race and ethnicity per vade politics to the serious 
detriment of the minority, from a permissible electoral system in 
which the racial and ethnic compositio n  of the elected body does 
not mirror that of the constituency. " 1 9� Lubbock's system fell on 
the unlawful side of the line because it "incorporates every feature 
that courts have identified as aggravating the impact of an at-large 
system. Indirectly, these features ' inescapably' act as formal obsta­
cles to effective minority participation. "196 Additionally, "the dis­
trict court found a continuity in effects between the history of dis­
crimination in Lubbock and the present levels of minority 
participation."197 The present political system, noted the panel, 
"preserves a past lack of access. "198 Therefore Lubbock loses: "On 
the strength of these factors, we find s ufficient support to uphold 
the district court's ultimate finding. " 199 
And what of the remedy? On the s ame day the district court 
condemned Lubbock's at-large system o n  the merits, it decreed its 
remedy: The court-ordered plan called for a six member council 
elected from single-member districts, and as in the past, a mayor 
elected at large. The panel affirmed the remedy without much 
trouble. 200 
191. Id. at 384. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 384-85. 
194. "Rather than emph 
· 
· 
· 
ts t 1 
asizmg any particular factors Congress has now directed the cour o app Y the objective factor test flexibly." Id at 384 195. Id. at 385. 
. 
· 
457 
�
�
�
� 1�
�0 <i��
t
!�f 
Washington v. Finlay, 664 F.2d 9 13, 920 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 
197. 727 F.2d at 385. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 386. 
200. The panel, sua sponte n t d " h . . not been made the subject of this' 
0 e 
,,s .ortcomm�s m the proceedings below that hav
e 
evidentiary hearing th 
�ppeal, viz.,  the failure of the district court to conduct an 
on e court-imposed rem d Id 38 ·c hal lenged, would have re uir d h 
� y. 
· at 7. "[T]he procedures, 1 c -
q e t at we vacate this order," said the court. Id. at 387. Judge 
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Lubbock's suggestion for rehearing en bane was denied a 
month after it was filed, with Judge Higginbotham expressing lin­
gering doubts about the strength of plaintiffs' proof of polarized 
voting. "The evidence here is suspect and presents a substantial 
risk of being wrong. It is unfortunate that a change in a city's form 
of government ultimately rests on such an uncertain footing. "201 
Judge Higginbotham's attack on Dr. Brischetto's statistics and on 
the doctor's methodology was devastating. 202 Yet the judgment 
stands. Lubbock, it strikes me, has got itself caught in a web of 
political ambiguity judicially construed. 203 
CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY LAW 
It is the general rule that military jurisdiction extends to the 
soldier but not to the civilian.204 On more than one occasion, how-
Randall added: 
For us to pass on the propriety of the district court's action, we must have either 
specific fact findings or, at least, a record sufficient to allow review. Without hearings, 
and without findings addressed to the government body's plan, we would not be in a 
position to determine whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in 
rejecting the City's plan. 
Id. The court nevertheless affirmed because: "Fortunately, in this case, the sole challenge by 
appellant focuses on the racial fairness of the court's plan, and the record in this case is 
adequate to review the plan's fairness." Id. 
201. Jones v. City of Lubbock, 730 F.2d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 1984) (on suggestion for 
rehearing en bane) (Higginbotham, J., concurring specially). 
202. The most striking aspect of Dr. Brischetto's study is that no other variables 
than race or ethnicity were tested. In other words, Dr. Brischetto did not test for 
other explanatory factors than race or ethnicity as intuitively obvious as campaign 
expenditure, party identification, income, media use measured by cost, religion, name 
identification, or distance that a candidate lived from any particular precinct . . . . 
Significantly, the inference of bloc voting from this model builds on an assumption 
that race or national origin is the only explanation for the correspondence. It ignores 
the reality that race or national origin may mask a host of other explanatory 
variables. 
Id. at 235. 
203. Judge Higginbotham ultimately concurred because: 
[G]iven that there is no evidence to rebut plaintiff's proof other than the City's criti­
cism of Dr. Brischetto's study and its attempt to show responsiveness, I agree with 
Judge Randall that the record is not so barren as to render clearly erroneous the 
finding by the district court that bloc voting was established. 
Id. at 236. But query, who has the burden of proof, measured by what quantum? 
204. w. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 89 (2d ed. 1896, 1920 reprint): 
[T]he general rule is that military persons-officers and enlisted men-are subject to 
the military jurisdiction, so long only as they remain such; that when, in any of the 
recognized legal modes of separation from the service, they cease to be military and 
become ciuil persons, such jurisdiction can, constitutionality, no more be exercised 
over them than it could before they originally entered the army, or than it can over 
any other members of the civil community. 
656 Loyola Law Review 
[ Vol. 30:619 
ever Congress has passed statutes-some quite old, 
some 
new�sweeping civilians under military jurisdiction. This, 
of 
course, means trial by court-martial, not trial by jury. For instance
, 
Article of War 602011 mandated military trial for ex-soldiers alleged
 
to have committed fraud against the United States while still in 
the service. The constitutionality of such recapture mechanisms 
was questioned quite early by Colonel William Winthrop-"the 
Blackstone of military law, a man of superb reasoning 
power"206-in his monumental Military Law and Preadents,201 
which was published in 1896 in a now classic second ed ition and 
reprinted "for the information of the service" in 1 920. 
2011 In a sec­
tion of his treatise entitled "General Principle of Non -Amenability 
of Civilians to the Military Jurisdiction in Time of Peace," Win­
throp wrote " [t]hat a civilian, entitled as he is, by Art. VI of the 
Amendments to the Constitution, to trial by jury, can not legally be 
made liable to the military law and jurisdiction, in time of peace, is 
a fundamental principle of our public law. "209 After a lengthy dis­
cussion of the "Constitutionality of the Statutes" to the contrary, 
Winthrop concluded with the italicized observation that "a statute 
cannot be framed by which a civilian can lawfully be made ame­
nable to the military jurisdiction in time of peace. "2 1 0 
Unlike Congress, the Supreme Court followed Colonel Win­
throp, holding in Toth v. Quarles211 that Congress l acked constitu­
tional power to subject former members of the armed forces to mil­
itary jurisdiction for trials of serious criminal offenses allegedly 
committed while still in the military, and that article 3 (a)  of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)212 establishing such ju­
risdiction was accordingly unconstitutional.213 Under Toth, the 
205. Ch. 227, 41  Stat. 759, 800 (1920), superceded by THE UNIFORM C ODE OF MILITARY 
JUSTICE, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1982) . 
. 206. The charac�erization .is General E.H. Crowder's, Judge Advocate General of the Umted States Army, m Establishment of Military Justice Hearings on S 64 B f 
S b · f h 
' . , e ore a 
u committee ? t e Senate Committee on Military Affairs, 66th Cong. , 1st Sess. 1171,  
(1919), quoted m F.B. WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE 229 ( 1967) 
207. W. WINTHROP, supra note 204. 
· 
208. By Order of the Secretary of War, Feb. 9, 1920, per P.C. March, General Ch' f Staff. WINTHROP, Id. at 3. ' Ie of 
209. Id. at 105. 
210. Id. at 107. 
211. 350 U.S. 11 (1955). 
212. 10 u.s.c. § 804 (1982). 
213. 350 U.S. at 1 1-12. The recapture provision of the U ·r c d m orm o e art 3(a) 10 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1982), had been expressly enacted by Congress in d t ' 
· 
' holding in the Hirshberg case (United States ex rel H1· hb 
or
e 
er
k 
o overcome the 
. . rs erg v. oo e,  336 U.S. 210 
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power granted to Congress " [t]o make Rules for the Government 
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," pursuant to . art. I, § 
8, cl. 14, "would seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction to per­
sons who are actually members or part of the armed forces," said 
Hugo Black's opinion for the Supreme Court majority.214 
Enter Wendy Wickham, whose case is, quite frankly, dizzying 
in its effects. Without question Wickham v. Hall210 is the Gordian 
knot of the term, an "insoluble conundrum"218 that first divided 
the Court of Military Appeals in W ashington217 and then split the 
(1949)) that the fact of discharge terminated military jurisdiction. See H.R. REP. No. 491, 
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 ( 1949); S. REP. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949). The Toth case 
seesawed back and forth as it was fought out through the several stages of the judicial hier­
archy. The district court first ordered Toth returned to Washington from Korea, whence he 
had been brought for court-martial shortly after his apprehension by military police in the 
United States. Toth v. Talbott, 113 F. Supp. 330 (D.D.C. 1953). Next, after a hearing the 
district court issued the writ of habeas corpus and ordered Toth released. Toth v. Talbott, 
114 F. Supp. 468 (D.D.C. 1953). On the Government's appeal, the district court's judgment 
was reversed, Talbott v. United States, 215 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1954), after which the Su­
preme Court granted certiorari and, after two arguments (see 349 U.S. 949 for the order 
directing reargument), the court of appeals judgment was reversed and Toth was authorita­
tively held, per Black, J. for the Court, outside military jurisdiction. The Toth case came as 
a shock to military authorities, and a surprise to Congress, although in the view of Colonel 
Frederick Bernays Wiener, a military lawyer of pre-eminent capacity, "[t]here can be no 
doubt, however, that the result finally reached was correct." F.B. WIENER, supra note 206, at 
308. 
One lower-eschelon military figure who was on the scene in Korea, Assistant Staff Judge 
Advocate Warren Mengis, now an esteemed colleague at the LSU Law Center, told the 
writer that his first reaction to the Toth case was that: "I didn't see any way that the mili­
tary could go to the United States and pick up the boy because he had been discharged." 
But when this lowly advice-prescient though it was-reached a higher link in the chain of 
command, it was disregarded with the comment that: "The Lieutenant Colonel isn't inter­
ested in being told he can't do it, just tell him how to do it." Whereupon Air Force military 
police were dispatched to Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, to pick up Toth and fly him back to 
Korea. Ex rel. Professor Warren Mengis to Paul R. Baier, at the Law Center, Louisiana 
State University (Aug. 28, 1984). 
214. 350 U.S. at 15. Justice Black added: 
There is a compelling reason for construing the clause this way: any expansion of 
court-martial jurisdiction like that in the 1950 Act necessarily encroaches on the ju­
risdiction of federal courts set up under Article III of the Constitution where persons 
on trial are surrounded with more conditional safeguards than in military tribunals. 
215. 706 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1983). 
216. Id. at 720 (Thornberry, J., dissenting). 
217. Wickham v. Hall, 12 M.J. 145 (1981). The civilian judges of the highest military 
court divided 1-1-1,  with Judge Cook reaching the merits and sustaining the constitutional­
ity of article 3(b) of the Uniform Code, 10 U.S.C. § 803(b) (1982), which authorizes recap­
ture of ex-soldiers alleged to have procured their discharge from the military by fraud and 
also authorizes trial by court-martial on the fraud charge. Judge Fletcher concurred in the 
result on jurisdictional grounds, without reaching the merits of the constitutional question 
presented. Chief Judge Everett dissented, thus abiding a view he first espoused as a former 
Commissioner of the Court of Military Appeals, in his treatise MILITARY JusTICE IN THE 
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Fifth Circuit (2-1) in New Orleans. The question was Ms. Wick­
ham's amenability to court-martial for alleged fraud i n  the pro­
curement of her pregnancy discharge from the military. The A�my 
said she submitted a false urine sample, therefore s h e  was still a 
soldier subj ect to court-martial under the recapture m e chan ism of 
article 3(b) of the UCMJ: "Each p erson discharged from the armed 
forces who is later charged with having fraudule ntly obtained his 
discharge is . . . subject to trial by court-martial on that charge 
•
•
•
•
 "218 Wickham, of course, said she was pregnant i n  fact ,  there­
fore the discharge was valid and she is a civilian. Her lawyer, citing 
Toth, claimed the Army lacked constitutional power to try citizen 
Wickham by court-martial. At this point, my m i nd , a n d  perhaps 
the reader's too, is spinning like a top. 
"According to Wickham, this is the rub. Who should decide 
whether she fraudulently procured her discharge, a civil or a mili­
tary court? "219 Here is how Chief Judge Clark described the consti­
tutional whirligig of Wickham v. Hall: 
She contends she is a civilian until her discharge is prove n to be 
fraudulently procured. To allow the military court to assert ju risdic­
tion over the claim that her discharge was fraudulently procured so 
that the military court can determine whether there was fraud in its 
procurement presumes she is still in the service. It is just as ci rcular, 
however, to presume the discharge is valid and thereby confer upon 
a civil court jurisdiction to decide the issue of validity. 2 2 0  
ARMED FORCES O F  THE UNITED STATES 36 ( 1965): "In the light of the Toth case, it is clear 
that [article 3(b)] is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes court-martial of an ex-service­
man for getting a fraudulent discharge." That Chief Judge Everett was only following him­
self on the bench is the writer's observation, not the unseemly boast of Robinson O. Everett 
C.J., dissenting. Every branch of the Armed S ervices was invited to participate as amici 
curiae in the Court of Military Appeals when it heard Wendy Wickham's case, and the oral 
arguments lasted an entire day, unusual procedures for what was plainly recognized as a 
knotty constitutional case. 
. 
218. 10 ?:S.C. § 803(b) (1982). While article 3(b) is the section that confers jurisdic­tion,
_ 
the prov1s1on that makes the act criminal is article 83, IO U.S.C. § 883 ( 1 982),  which 
provides: 
Any person who--
. (1) procures his o:-vn enlistment or appointment in the armed forces by know­mg�y false represe�tat10n or deliberate concealment as to his qualifications for that enlistment or appomtment and receives pay or allowances thereunder· or 
(2! procure� his own separation from the armed forces by knowin�ly false repre­sentation or 
_
deliberate concealment as to his eligibility for that separation; 
shall be pumshed as a court-martial may direct. 
219. 706 F.2d at 717. 
220. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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The court held, per Clark, C.J., that " (a]rticle 3(b) of the UCMJ is, 
on its face, a constitutional assignment of military court 
. . d' t' 11221 JUrIS IC 10n. 
The Fifth Circuit majority distinguished Toth: "A soldier may 
not by fraud cut short his military status before his service obliga­
tion is complete. "222 The majority invoked the reasoning power of 
Colonel Winthrop: " [D) ischarge is only effective if it is validly pro­
cured. It must be 'due and legal, not fraudulent.' "113 Chief Judge 
Clark recited from the legislative history of article 3(b); we are told 
that "Congress was reacting to cases arising after World War II in 
which servicemen had fraudulently procured discharges . . .  [and] 
then used their  fraudulently obtained discharges to block military 
court action. "224 Just how many cases Congress had in mind, or 
their details, does not appear. The majority said further that: 
"Recognizing the seriousness of the problem, Congress gave mili­
tary tribunals the authority to deal with an offense that would 
strike at the very heart of the individual's military commit­
ment. "326 Moreover, the majority judges were unwilling to presume 
that anything but a fair resolution of the fraud issue awaits Ms. 
Wickham before the military tribunal. " [M]ilitary courts are not 
Kafkaesque Star Chambers,"116 said Chief Judge Clark, although 
his opinion conceded that, " [G)rand jury presentment and trial by 
petit jury are not parts of the system, and there is no right to bail 
• • • •  
"227 At any rate, whether Wickham's discharge was validly or 
fraudulently procured "depends in large part upon army regula­
tions and procedures. Such matters fall within the special expertise 
of the military courts. We should defer to them in these 
221. Id. at 718. 
222. Id. at 716-17. 
223. Id. at 717 (quoting W. WINTHROP, supra note 204, at 89 n.46). 
224. Id. at 716. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 717. 
227. Id. In Toth, 350 U.S. at 17, Justice Black commented on military trials vis-a-vis 
trial by jury in federal court: 
[C]onceding to  military personnel that high degree of honesty and sense of justice 
which nearly all of them undoubtedly have, it still remains true that military tribu­
nals have not been and probably never can be constituted in such way in such way 
that they can have the same kind of qualifications that the Constitution has deemed 
essential to fair trials of civilians in federal courts . . . .  Strides have been made 
toward making courts-martial less subject to the will of the executive department 
which appoints, supervises and ultimately controls them. But from the very nature of 
things, courts have more independence in passing on the life and liberty of people 
than do military tribunals. 
660 
respects. "228 
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Not so, according to Judge Thornberry's dissen t ,  which is 
pitched heavily on the presumption of innocence: " I n  order to �x­
ercise jurisdiction over Wickham a court-martial must necessarily 
presume that she is a servicewoma n .  However, she would only be a 
servicewoman if she is guilty of the very offense for which it wishes 
to try her; fraudulent separation from the service. "22
11 However, 
neither common law nor military law authorizes such a presump­
tion of guilt. "Quite the contrary. The presumption of i n nocence is 
a fundamental tenet of both systems of justice. "230 Thus, " [t]he 
Army finds itself in the uncomfortable position of having to pre­
sume her guilt. There is no way out of this catch -22; the Army 
wishes to try her to prove her guilt, but it cannot try h e r  unless her 
guilt has already been proved. "231 
Along with Chief Judge Everett of the Court of Military Ap­
peals, Judge Thornberry pointed out that, "This is a case of first 
impression. The Armed Services have gotten along nicely for more 
than thirty years without having to invoke Article 3(b)  against for­
mer servicemen or women. "232 The majority's loose talk about 
thinning the ranks of those ready to fight 
through fraudulently obtained discharges is a chimera. I see no justi­
fication for expanding military jurisdiction to combat a problem that 
simply has not been shown to exist. As Justice Black noted in Toth: 
"It is impossible to think that the discipline of the Army is going to 
be disrupted, its morale impaired, or its orderly processes d isturbed 
by giving ex-servicemen the benefit of a civilian court trial when 
they are actually civilians."233 
�ud?e Th�rnberry's dissent, !ike the majority opinion, is not lack­
ing m certitude. The reader IS stoutly informed: "Article 3 (b) like 
Article 3(a) , is unquestionably unconstitutional. "234 The di�sent 
concluded: "I share the majority's concern that our natio n  continue 
to be defended by an effective fighting force . . . .  However, I do 
not believe that our continued security can only be bought at the 
228. 706 F.2d at 717-18. 
229. Id. at 720 (Thornberry, J., dissenting). 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at 721. 
232. Id. at 722. 
233. Id. Judge Thornberry obviously is a greater admirer of Justice Black wh h calls "one of the most eminent jurists of this century." Id. at 724 n.7. 
' om e 
234. Id. at 723 (quoting from Chief Judge Everett's treatise MILITARY JusTic note 217). E, supra 
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price of unconstitutionally subjecting civilians to the jurisdiction of 
the courts-martial. "23� 
Now for a few comments from the sidelines, presented in sum­
mary milM.ary fashion: 
(1)  It is very strange that the old case of United States ex rel. 
Flannery v. Commanding General236 should go unmentioned in ei­
ther the m ajority or, especially, the dissenting opinions in Wick­
ham's case. In Flannery, a case decided almost 40 years ago, the 
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York de­
clared the codal predecessor of article 3(b) unconstitutional in 
these jolting words: 
The cancellation or recall of a discharge for fraud presents a justici­
able issue that only a court may decide (Article 3), whether the 
fraud be such as to make the discharge void or such as to make it 
voidable. The very question whether it be void or voidable is an is­
sue that only a court may decide. Any assertion of an arbitrary 
power to cancel or to recall it is made nugatory by the constitutional 
requirement of due process.237 
(2) Nor is any mention made of a Columbia Law Review note 
on the subject of "The Amenability of the Veteran to Military 
Law," published in 1946, which, on cogent reasoning, concluded: 
" [T]he termination of military control inherent in a discharge 
should require a civil suit to cancel it for fraud."238 And more: 
235. 706 F.2d at 725. 
236. 69 F. Supp. 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), vacated by stipulation, Order No. 20235, slip 
op. (2d Cir. 1946) (unreported). No briefs were filed, and there was no record on appeal. See 
unpublished letter to N.Y.L.J. from attorney of record for relator in Flannery, Joseph 
Quittner, Esq., June 14, 1946: 
It is most important to note that the Circuit Court of Appeals was not even in session 
on April 17 and April 18, 1946, the dates of stipulation and order of reversal . . . .  
There was no record on appeal. There were no papers on appeal. There were no briefs 
. . . . The reversal of the order on stipulation in view of the facts narrated above, 
does not and could not constitute a disagreement by the Circuit Court of Appeals 
with the reasons for the decision as expressed in the learned opinion of the District 
Court. 
Quoted in Note, The Amenability of the Veteran to Military Law, 46 CoLUM. L. REV. 977,  
977 n.2  ( 1946). 
237. 69 F. Supp. at 664. 
238. Note, supra note 236, at 984 (footnote omitted). The Note relies on the analogy 
found in the revocation of naturalization certificates, patents, and land grants. "The proper 
procedure for cancelling such instruments conferring important rights under the authority 
of the United States has been suit by the Government in the civil courts." Id. The Note also 
relies on Mr. Justice Frankfurter's discussion of denaturalization proceedings in Baumgart­
ner v. United States, 332 U.S. 665, 675 (1944), to the effect that since " [n]ew relations and 
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" [T]he provision of Section 10 [of the Manu�l for Cou
_
rts- Martial, 
the predecessor of Article 3 (b)] for cancellat10n o f  a d i scharge for 
fraud is without statutory or constitutional basis. "239 
(3) Tedious review of 742 pages of House hearings on the bill 
to establish the UCMJ, of 1 10 pages of House Report, o f  334 pages 
of Senate hearings, and of 40 pages of Senate Report-some 1 226 
pages of legislative history in all2"0-shows that neither the Flan­
nery case nor the Columbia Law Review note was ever brought to 
Congress's attention. On the contrary, the House and S enate we�e 
both left in the dark regarding these earlier judicial and academi­
cal discussions touching the constitutionality of article 3(b ) . 20 All 
new interest flow" once citizenship has been granted, these "should not he undone unless 
the proof is compelling that that which was granted was obtained" by fraud. The Columbia 
commentator further reasons: 
"New relations and new interests," which i nvolve fundamental liberties, flow also 
from the granting of a discharge and should likewise demand com pelling p roof before 
cancellation for fraud. If the courts are the only tribunals appropriate to adjudicate 
the property rights involved in fraudulently obtained patents and land gran ts.  judi­
cial action should be required to pass upon the "compelling" proof necessary t o  pro­
tect the human rights involved in cancellation of a discharge. 
46 CoLUM. L. REV. at 985 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original). 
239. 46 CoLUM. L. REV. at 985. No mention is made of this Columbia Late Ret'iew note 
in any of the briefs filed in the Fifth Circuit in Wickham v. Hall, a shortcoming evident 
from the writer's personal inspection of the appdlate filings in this case. 
240. Fortunately bound and indexed by the Judge Advocate General of the United 
States Navy, INDEX AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 
(U.S.G.P.O. 1950), a volume unlikely kept on any Fifth Circuit judge's shelf, and certainly 
not found in the Court's Library in New Orleans. Ex rel. Maxwell Dodson, Fifth Circuit 
Librarian. This volume was put in my hands after about an hour 's search by Mrs . Helen 
Nelson, herself an expert on the whereabouts of government documents located in the LSU 
Law Library. 
241. It has happened before, apropos art. 2 ( 1 1) ,  Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 
U.S.C. § 802(11) (1982), which the Supreme Court finally knocked down, after reversing 
itself on rehearing, in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (again per Black, J.).  Of article 
2(11),  Colonel Wiener told the Court: "But nowhere in all the voluminous legislative history 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is there a single expression, from any source, that 
reflects so much as a glimmering awareness of any constitutional problem." Brief for Appel­
lee at 57, Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956), reprinted in 52 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGU· 
MENTS, supra note 159, at 159, 215. During reargument, the following colloquy between 
Court and counsel occurred: 
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS: Was there any indication by the committee that was con­
sidering the bill as to their purpose in drafting this provision of the Code? 
MR. WIENER: Yes. Their purpose was to carry forward what had been Article of 
War 2(d) since 1916. Nobody sensed a constitutional issue. In the language which the 
draftsman of the committee once used in a classroom in my hearing, they didn't even 
know enough to be confused. 
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS: Was Professor Morgan [of the Harvard Law School] one 
of the draftsman? 
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that Felix Larkin, the Secretary of Defense's lawyer, said by impli­
cation about the Flannery case at the hearings was: "I might point 
out in connection with [ Article 3] (b) that it is new and while it has 
been a regulation we did not have much confidence in the stability 
of a regulation of this character. "242 Perhaps Mr. Larkin had Judge 
Clancy's constitutional ruling in mind. One cannot tell reading the 
printed record. 
(4) The comments of Mr. Larkin, on which Chief Judge Clark 
hangs the majority's legislative history, plainly show a man full of 
constitutional doubt about the recapture provisions of article 3: 
MR. LARKIN. There is one concern that I would have-and I 
do not know the answer, frankly-which has to do with the third 
type, if you will, and that is the person who serves, is discharged and 
who neither joins the Reserves or does not reenlist and becomes for 
all purposes a civilian. 
The question I have in connection with it-actually I think if it 
were possible you ought to be consistent across the boards in those 
types of cases-is the constitutionality of attempting to retain a 
continuing jurisdiction over that person since now he clearly is not 
in the land or naval forces even though while he was in them he did 
commit an offense which would have made him subject to its juris­
diction if tried at that time. 
Now perhaps my concern is exaggerated but I think there is a 
difficult legal problem in that one type at least.243 
MR. WIENER: He was the draftsman. 
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS: He knew quite a little bit about constitutional law, didn't 
he? 
MR. WIENER: Not in this field, Mr. Justice, not in this field . . . .  
The quotation is from the sound recording of the reargument, No. 701, Oct. Term 1955, 
Reid v. Covert, reargued on Feb. 27, 1957, reprinted in 52 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGU­
MENTS, supra note 159, at 841. The author uses excerpts from the actual oral arguments in 
Reid v. Covert, including Mr. Justice Douglas's questions, in teaching constitutional law at 
the LSU Law School. For details, see Baier, What Is the Use of a Law Book Without Pic­
tures or Conversations?, 34 J. LEGAL Enuc. 619 (1984) (forthcoming). 
Lest it be thought that Colonel Wiener's assault on Professor Morgan was too strong, it 
should be noted that the Court ultimately agreed with the Colonel, not the Professor, and 
that Justice Douglas himself publicly described Colonel Wiener as "our foremost military 
law authority." Douglas, Book Review, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 568 (1968) (reviewing F.B. WIENER, 
CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE (1967)). 
242. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before a Subcommit­
tee of the House Committee on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 885 (1949) (statement 
of Felix Larken, March 18, 1949). 
243. Id. at 881. That Mr. Larkin had doubts about the constitutionality of the law did 
not escape Mr. Justice Black's eagle eye. See Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. at 21 n.19. 
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The Supreme Court, as we know, elevated Mr. Larkin
_
's doubt into 
a constitutional holding in Toth v. Quarles. As for article 3( b), Mr. 
Larkin told House Subcommittee mem bers that "(b) is part of a 
similar philosophy, let us say."244 He further told the Congressmen: 
"Although most of the comments against this article were that we 
were trying to encroach and enlarge our jurisdiction, we would be 
happy with the restrictions of a statute of limitations, and not hav­
ing jurisdiction over what is triable in the civil courts. "24& 
(5) Both Chief Judge Everett of the Court of Military Appeals 
and Judge Thornberry in his dissent noted, citing Winthrop's trea­
tise, that "the Army has several adequate alternative remedies 
available to it, none of which raises the constitutional issue before 
us. "246 They pointed out that Wickham could be prosecuted either 
civilly or criminally for fraud against the Government in federal 
court.247 
(6) Major General Thomas H. Green, The Judge Advocate 
General of the Army, told Senator Kefauver and his colleagues on 
the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee that "[t]he code has 
many defects."248 General Green especially objected to " [t]he 
sweeping extension of military jurisdiction over civilians (arts. 2, 
3) ," explaining: 
It has been my experience that no matter how just and fair the sys­
tem of military justice may be, if it reaches out to the civilian com­
munity, every conceivable emotional attack is concentrated on the 
system. This is as it should be. The framers of the Constitution rec­
ognized that civilians should be tried by civilian courts and they es­
tablished a military system of courts for the Army and Navy. 249 
244. Supra note 242 at 885. Contrast the bald assertion in the Government's brief to 
the Fifth Circuit· " [T]h t"  
· 
· · e cons 1tubonahty of prosecuting soldiers by courts-martial for 
fraudulently procured separations has never been in doubt." Brief for Alvin 0. Hall, Colo-
�el, U.S. 
_Ar�y, and United States of America at 26 n.4, Wickham v. Hall, supra note 215. 0 m�ntion 18 made in the Government's brief of the contrary holding of Flannery v. Com-manding General, discussed supra 236 in text accompanying nn. 237. 
245. Supra note 242, at 884. 
246. 706 F.2d at 722-23. 
247. Wickham could be p ted ,. f . § 
287 ( 1 982), or 18 U.S.C 
rosecu 
" •0r rau� m federal district court under .1� 
U.�.C. 
fraud · t w· k 
. § lOOl (l982). Alternatively, the Army could bring a c1v1l smt for 
agams 1c ham seeking t b 
dischar f d l 
' 0 prove Y a mere preponderance of the evidence that her ge was rau u ently obtained." 706 F.2d at 723 
248. Uniform Code of M"l "t r · · • 
S b . 
l l ary e1ustice, Hearings o n  S 857 and H R  4080 Be1ore a u committee of the S t c · 
· 
· · 1' 
(statement of Ma' G 
en
T
a
h
e ommittee on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 256 (1949) J. en. omas H. Green May 9 1949) �� u ' . . 
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All of which leaves this side-liner with the gnawing conviction 
that Wickham v. Hall was inadequately aired, if not wrongly de­
cided, in New Orleans. 
What, for example, is the relevance of the necessary and 
proper clause to Ms. Wickham's case? Mr. Justice Frankfurter 
asked Colonel Frederick Bernays Wiener, whose intellect and spirit 
are lineal to Winthrop's, a similar question in Mrs. Covert's case: 
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: I would like to ask you whether, 
ass uming everything you s ay is so, that these haven't the status, 
they're not part of the Armed Forces, what of the doc trine that i s  
often resorted to-or one of the considerations i n  c onstitutional c on­
struc tion-that you may s w eep into an exerc ise of power some pen­
umbra! situations which are not explicitly within the grant of power, 
in order to give effec tiveness  to the grant of power? 
MR. WIENER: I will give a short answer now and then discuss it at 
length under the necess ary and proper c lause. The answer is, you 
c annot sweep beyond the 1789 boundary of j ury trial. On that I am 
on common ground with the Solicitor General. 2110 
These thorny problems were never addressed by the Fifth Circuit 
in Wendy Wickham's case; they are not even raised. More is re­
quired, it seems to me, to get a good grip on this whirligig of a 
case. 
For the benefit of curious readers, not to mention future 
judges, I should add there can be little doubt that Colonel Win­
throp and other superbly-m inded military lawyers would stoutly 
maintain the constitutionality of article 3(b) , and on very logical 
grounds.2&1 But I have no doubt myself that " Captain Hugo Black 
250. The quotation is from the sound recording of the reargument, No. 701, Oct. Term 
1955, Reid u. Couert, reargued on Feb. 27, 1957, reprinted in 52 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND 
ARGUMENTS, supra note 159, at 840-41. Again, this high voltage exchange between court and 
counsel is well worth playing and commenting upon in our constitutional law classes. See 
supra note 241. 
251. Of fraudulent enlistment, Colonel Winthrop says the offense, absent receipt of 
pay or allowance thereunder, is logically not triable by court-martial, for the reason that the 
fraudulent representations must have been preliminary and made as an inducement to the 
enlistment "while therefore the individual was still a civilian and not constitutionally ame­
nable to such trial." W. WINTHROP, supra note 204, at 733-34 (emphasis in original). A con­
trario, where a discharge is procured by fraud, the soldier remains a soldier, subject to trial 
by court-martial, or so Colonel Winthrop might reason. Chief Judge Clark's opinion in 
Wickham v. Hall, 706 F.2d at 717 n.3, cites W. WINTHROP, supra note 204, at 550, for the 
proposition that a discharge obtained by falsehood or fraud may be revoked. But Colonel 
Winthrop's treatise says nothing expressly on the matter of who tries the fraud issue. That 
Colonel W inthrop would support the result in Wickham u. Hall is left to implication be­
tween the pages. 
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of the Field Artillery"262 would just as steadfastly strike it down 
were it his judicial duty to do so. 
And what of Wendy Wickham? Was she pregnant in fact, or 
merely a soldier disguised in maternity clothes? Th.
e matte�, I'm 
afraid will never be tried. As soon as the Army won 1 ts case m the 
Fifth 
'
circuit, it dangled over Ms. Wickham's head a full release 
from the military, without fear of court-martial or jail, in  exchange 
for a signed confession of guilt!263 Having had quite enough �f the 
U.S. Army, Wickham signed on the dotted line. Naturally, this left 
her lawyer, who thought he had a triable case before the co�rt­
martial and a cert-worthy case before the Supreme Court, hangmg 
in legal limbo. 
OF THE FEE 
We reach pleasurable ground: "The matter of fees is impor­
tant, far beyond the mere question of bread and butter involved. 
Properly attended to, fuller justice is done to both lawyer and 
client. "264 
Note well ye lawyers: Judge Tuttle has laid it down as the law 
of our Circuit that an attorney litigant proceeding pro se is entitled 
to an award of attorney's fees under the federal Freedom of Infor­
mation Act.2H It was so held this term in Cazalas u. United States 
Department of Justice,266 and practical lawyers everywhere will 
doubtless approve of this one. Judge Tuttle rejected the usual fac­
ile arguments against allowing a successful pro se lawyer to take a 
statutory fee, as well as a judgment, against the defendant. "We 
find little evidence to support appellees' assertion that the purpose 
of the fee provision is to insure objective representation by an at­
torney. On the contrary, the fee provision is designed to promote 
vigorous advocacy on behalf of citizens seeking government infor-
252. From the title of chapter 10 of Justice Black's memoirs , H. BLACK & E. BLACK, 
THE MAGNIFICENT REBEL: A PERSONAL MEMOIR, (P. Baier ed.; forthcomi:lg from Random 
House). 
253. Ex. rel. Stewart J. Alexander, Esq., San Antonio, Tex., Ms. Wickham·s counsel. 
254. The words are those of Abraham Lincoln, in notes for a law lecture, quoted in F.T. HILL, LINCOLN THE LAWYER 241 (1906). Lincoln also had the right idea on m tt f bs . "H . . a ers o su tance. e never surrend�red his conscience to a code; his sense of justice was never cowed by the tyranny of 'leadmg cases' and the decision of the highest court in th Id d d · 
· 
· 
h. 
e wor never succee e m convmcmg 1m that wrong was right." Id. at 43. 
255. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982). 
256. 709 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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mation . . "2117 Judge Tuttle brushed aside the notion that pro 
se lawyers, as distinguished from pro bono lawyers, should work for 
free: "Appellant amply demonstrated the costs she incurred, both 
from other work foregone and in terms of personal energy, due to 
her pro se work."2118 Ms. Cazalas sought documents relating to al­
leged sexual discrimination she suffered as an Assistant United 
States Attorney. "Surely it is in the 'public interest' to discover, if 
true, that the Department of Justice is less than entirely just in its 
dealings," said Judge Tuttle.259 Surely he is right. "The public, as 
the beneficiary and the ultimate client of the Department of Jus­
tice's efforts to insure compliance with federal laws, needs to know 
the type of information sought by appellant in order to maintain 
effective oversight of its elected and appointed officials."260 The ar­
guments mounted by the Government against allowing Ms. Cazalas 
to take her fee, said the court, "are inadequate to overcome the 
strong national policy of open government and the crucial role that 
attorney fees play in protecting this interest. "261 
The result in Cazalas is "good news," according to one civil 
rights warrior I questioned.262 And the reasoning of Judge Tuttle's 
opinion, which will doubtless carry great weight with his former 
colleagues on the old Fifth, augurs well for a similar holding in the 
future allowing pro se lawyers who lick the government to take a 
fee under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act.263 This, I'm 
sure, would be a welcome development among the Fifth Circuit's 
civil liberties lawyers-"Lilburne's Bastards," as they used to call 
us in seventeenth century England. 264 
257. Id. at 1056. 
258. Id. 
259. Id. at 1053. 
260. Id. at 1054. 
261. Id. at 1057. 
262. Ex rel. J. Minos Simon, Esq., Lafayette, Louisiana, "an able lawyer" (per Tate, 
J., Simon v. United States, 644 F.2d 490, 495 (5th Cir. 1981)), who hung on like a bulldog for 
10 years fighting a false arrest, eventually taking $25,000 by way of settlement on the dawn 
of a long-awaited trial. Simon spent his birthday, Feb. 27, 1973, in the Fulton County Jail in 
Atlanta, where he was "placed in isolation, and subject to a strip search." Id. at 493. "If this 
could happen to me, a lawyer, imagine what could happen to a layman," Simon told the 
reporters. See JO- Year Old Suit Settled by Attorney for $25,000, Morning Advocate [Baton 
Rouge],  Aug. 21, 1984, § B at 2, cols. 2 & 3. 
263. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). The question whether an attorney proceeding pro se is 
entitled to such fees is, as Judge Tuttle noted, an open one in the Fifth Circuit. 709 F.2d at 
1055 n.8 (citing Cofield v. City of Atlanta, 648 F.2d 986, 987 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
264. J. FRANK, THE LEVELLERS: A HISTORY OF THE WRITINGS OF THREE SEVENTEENTH­
CENTURY SOCIAL DEMOCRATS: JOHN LILBURNE, RICHARD OVERTON, WILLIAM w ALWYN 87 
(1955). When Overton was asked whether he was one of "Lilburne's Bastards," he merely 
668 Loyola Law Review 
[Vol. 30:619 
One more pointer on fees. If the defendant caves in on you, 
giving you what you want, be sure to collect y�ur statut�ry ?ttor­
n ey's fee. "Victory by judgment or an opponent s concession 1s not 
essential to identification of the 'prevailing party' entitled to recov­
ery of an attorney's fee . . . .  "266 Often when cornered in court "a 
defendant may unilaterally undertake action that moots the 
s uit. "266 In such a case, "plaintiff may still recover attorney's fees if 
he can show both a causal connection between the filing of the suit 
and the defendant's action and that the defendant's conduct was 
required by law, i.e., not a wholly gratuitous response to an action 
that in itself was frivolous or groundless. "267 Of course, sometimes 
it's difficult to determine what promp te d  the defendant to change 
c ourse. Judge Sam Johnson put it well in Posada v. Lamb County, 
Texas: "At bottom, the inquiry is an intensely factual, pragmatic 
one. Clues to the provocative effects o f  the plaintiffs' legal efforts 
are often best gleaned from the chronology of events: defendants, 
on the whole, are usually rather reluctant to concede that the liti­
gation prompted them to mend their ways. "268 
EPILOGUE: OF JUNKED MOTOR VEHICLES AND THE 
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
H ughes said of Brandeis that he was "master of both micro­
scope and telescope.  "269 I had better lay aside the microscope and 
switch to a final, telescopic view of the Fifth Circuit's universe. My 
c oncluding remarks are necessarily impressionistic and somewhat 
personal. Gazing out from Mt. Olympus is haunting duty. I hear 
Holmes's voice-"not the least godlike of man's activities is the 
large survey of causes"270-whispering i n  my ear. 
. First a word about an early legal acquaintance of m ine-:::revised," a s  t�e saying goes. Price v. City of Junction, 
T�xa� �akes me s mile. In that one, the court sustained the con­
stitutionality of a "junk car" ordinance. Tourists used to call the 
replied he was "free-born." Id. 
265. Williams v. Leatherbury, 672 F.2d 549 550 (5th c· 1982) 266. Id. at 551. 
' Ir. · 
267. Id. 
268· 716 F.2d 1066, 1 072,  (5th Cir. 1983). 269. Hughes Mr Just · B d · · d 
1 932).  
' 
· ice ran eis, m MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 3 (F.  Frankfurter e · 
270· �i�
F
· H
2d
OLMES, JR., The Profession of the Law in SPEECHES 22 (1891). 271.  · 582 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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place "Junky Junction," but not anymore.272 The police power is 
broad enough to save the ordinance substantively, and I'm glad to 
read that "aesthetics should not be ignored .  "273 There was plenty 
of due process built into the ordinance: ten days' notice and a pub­
lic hearing before execution of the law by tow truck. Of course, 
government must move cautiously in this area. It could not, for 
example, condemn my '64 Comet and order it removed to Black's 
Auto Salvage in Brusly. I admire the thoroughness and clean con­
stitutionality of the ordinance in question. As a younger man I had 
to write a junk car law for Cambridge, Massachusetts. I was a mere 
3-L at the time, with a needed summer job in the City Solicitor's 
office. For old times' sake I keep a decoupaged newspaper printing 
of the ordinance hanging on the wall. I shudder to think what a 
federal court would do to Cambridge's ordinance. 274 
This brings us to the exclusionary rule, which, in light of re­
cent rulings, is also the talk of the town. In closing, we come full 
circle to the voice of the past, and to the influence of judicial he­
roes in giving shape to o ur law. 
The Fifth Circuit was first in the Nation, among the federal 
circuits, to carve a "good faith" exception out of Mapp v. Ohio.276 
Some say United States v. Williams276 is a proud boast. It was 
eagerly followed this term by three new Fifth Circuit utility bal­
ancers,277 and it is the fact that the Supreme Court of the United 
States has lately come round to our Circuit's view. 278 I should have 
preferred to see the Supreme Court lead the Fifth Circuit, not fol­
low it, by enforcing the Bill of Rights. 
272. The stipulated record in the case indicated that the city was concerned about 
"junk cars being a fire hazard and a hinderance in the fighting of fires, an attractive nui­
sance to children; an obstacle in the luring of professional persons to locate in a city known 
as "Junky Junction," a liability in encouraging tourist trade, and an eyesore." 711  F.2d at 
588. 
273. Id. at 588-89. 
274. Cambridge, Mass., Ordinance No. 773 (Sept. 16, 1968) (first Publication in Cam­
bridge Chronicle-Sun, Aug. 22, 1968). The author is informed through the good offices of 
Mr. Paul E. Healy, Cambridge City Clerk, that old No. 733 is still on the books, that li­
censes to store junk cars in Cambridge are issued about twice a year under the Ordinance, 
and that, thank goodness, it "has not been questioned as to its constitutionality." Letter 
from Paul E. Healy to Paul R. Baier (Sept. 14, 1984) (copy on file with the Loyola Law 
Review). 
275. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
276. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane) , cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). 
277. United States v. Mahoney, 712 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1983) (per Higginbotham, J., 
joined by Ingraham and Williams, JJ.). 
278. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3416 n.11 ( 1 984). 
670 Loyola Law Review 
[ Vol. 30:619 
Justice Brennan in his Leon dissent speaks of "the teaching 
of 
. l "279 d those Justices who first formulated the exclus10nary ru e, an 
my mind drifts back to what Justice Tom Cl_
ark told my students 
about Mapp v. Ohio one month before he died. We were_ 
a sma�l 
seminar-the Justice and a bus load of young people, _
with their 
teacher, on a field trip to the Court. I treasure the voice of that 
humble Texan's teaching: 
I couldn't u nderstand why Wolf u. Colorado said that the 
Fourth Amendment applied to the states, but it just didn't seem to 
go all the way-in fact it was just an empty gesture, sort of like w
.
hat 
Chief Justice Hughes used to say: No use to have a C onstitu­
tion-it's pretty, got all sorts of nice fringes around it, but it doesn'.t 
mean anything, just a piece of paper-unless you really live by it 
and enforce it. And so that's true with Mapp and the Fourth 
Amendment. 280 
279. 104 S. Ct. 3430, 3433 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
280. Interview with Tom C. Clark, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, Retired , East Conference Room, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash­
ington, D.C. (May 3, 1977) (recorded with the permission of Justice Clark). Obviously, Tom 
Clark had his heroes who shaped his views, and perhaps the students who heard Justice 
C lark were influenced in turn by his teaching. See generally P. THOMPSON, THE VmcE OF 
THE PAST: ORAL HISTORY 225-26 (1978): 
[T]he real justification of history is not in giving an immortality to a few of the old. It 
is part of the way in which the living understand their place and part in the world 
. . . .  [H)istory can help people to see how they stand, and where they should go 
. . . .  And in giving a past, it also helps them towards a future of their own making. 
And consider, in this connection, what Archibald Cox had to say when he wound up his 
review (91 HARV. L. REV. 1 1 70, 1182-83 (1979)) of Joel Seligman's THE HIGH CITADEL: THE 
INFLUENCE OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1978): 
In the end, young men and women do not set their compasses solely-or even 
chiefly-by courses of formal instruction . . . .  Much used to be done by portraying 
great figures in Anglo-American Law: Coke, Erskine, Marshall, Story, Evarts, Rufus 
Choate, Clarence Darrow, Holmes and Brandeis. The list goes on and on. Today one 
would add Robert H. Jackson, Hugo Black, Earl Warren, Felix Frankfurter, 
Thurgood Marshall, and many others. I cannot speak for my colleagues, but I have 
failed to present the examples that my classmates and I admired as Austin Scott 
Felix Frankfurter, and Edmund Morgan presented them to us. The mood has seemed 
against it. History and heroes seemed to command little attention from the "now" 
generation. I would like to have the opportunity back. 
